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ABSTRACT 
DEREK SMITH: Xenophanes, the Gods, and the Reinvention of Poetic Authority 
  (Under the direction of Peter Smith) 
 
 This thesis explores the nature and authority of the theological comments made by 
Xenophanes of Colophon. In my first chapter I discuss the critical and positive fragments 
of Xenophanes’ work and attempt to both construct a consistent theological account and 
discover the methods by which he arrives at his conclusions. After adopting James 
Lesher’s position that Xenophanes is rejecting the possibility of divine communication, I 
explore the consequences of this radical pronouncement in my second chapter: if 
Xenophanes, unlike his poetic predecessors, does not have access to the gods through 
divine inspiration, how can he speak authoritatively about divine matters? In this chapter 
I begin by discussing the gods, truth, and authority in the works of Homer and Hesiod 
before analyzing these concepts in the fragments of Xenophanes. In my third chapter I 
attempt to pinpoint the significance of Xenophanes’ position by comparing his thoughts 
with those of two (roughly) contemporary poets, Parmenides and Pindar.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The poems of Xenophanes of Colophon, most of which remain in fragmentary 
form, are provocative and frustratingly obscure. He touches upon a variety of topics – 
including political advice, natural philosophy, theology, and epistemology – but often the 
context, source, and precise meaning of his ideas are unclear. The doxographical 
testimonia frequently further confuse matters by conflating the ideas of Xenophanes with 
those of later thinkers such as Parmenides and the Sceptics. Perhaps the most intriguing 
feature of Xenophanes’ work is his claim that there is “one god, greatest among gods and 
men” (B23).1 What precisely is this god and from where does Xenophanes derive this 
belief?  
 I will begin this project in my first chapter by exploring this question. I will look 
at both the critical fragments (B10-B17), in which Xenophanes attacks the traditional 
conventions found in epic poetry and popular religion, and the constructive ones (B23-
B26), in which he postulates the existence of one supreme god who remains stationary 
and moves all by the “mind of his mind” (νόου φρήν, B 25). I will argue that his rejection 
of the anthropomorphic representations of the gods found in poetry and religious images 
serves as the foundation for his abstract and unified conception of the divine. Moreover, 
his comments on the limitation of human knowledge in B18 and B34-B35 add another 
dimension to his attacks on traditional religion: the gods have not communicated directly 
                                                 
1 I will reference every fragment of Xenophanes’ own work by using the Diels-Kranz arrangement: B 
followed by the number of the fragment; for testimonial fragments I will in most cases provide both the 
Diels-Kranz designation (A followed by the number) as well as the location within the text itself.  
 with mortals and so humans must rely on the superior, albeit limited, methods of inquiry 
and autopsy. Xenophanes’ thoughts on the divine are tentative: they approximate true 
things (ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι, B35) but the clear truth (τὸ σαφές, B34) about the gods is 
beyond the reach of human knowledge. The focus of this thesis will then shift to the 
question of Xenophanes’ authority: if he rejects the possibility of communication 
between gods and humans, including the poetic inspiration from the Muses that Homer 
and Hesiod claim to have possessed, what does he offer to his audience that will persuade 
them to adopt his religious views over those of his allegedly inspired predecessors? 
 In order to answer this question, I will begin my second chapter with an 
examination of the works of Homer and Hesiod. I will first explore the complex and 
overlapping relationship between gods and humans found in poems of Homer before 
discussing the privileged status and authority of the bard. Homer not only invokes the 
Muses at appropriate moments, using their authority to vouch for his accuracy, but also 
uses the figure of Demodicus to favorably compare the account of a divinely inspired 
bard with the experience of Odysseus who was actually present at the events described in 
the bard’s song (Od. 487-491). The conception of poetic truth is quite nuanced: although 
the phrase κατὰ κόσμον is used by Odysseus as an indication of the accuracy of 
Demodicus’ song, the term κόσμος (Homer does not use ἀληθείη or related terms in 
reference to poetry)2 also bears connotations of aesthetic beauty and social propriety. In 
Hesiod’s Theogony the Muses themselves confront the poet and explain that they are 
quite willing to speak plausible falsehoods as well as truth (26-28). The personal element 
of Hesiod’s work is an important feature of his authority; the poet can draw teachings 
from his own life as well as from the Muses. Finally I will discuss the world of 
                                                 
2 Pratt 1993, 22 
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 Xenophanes and the manner in which he revises and reinvents poetic authority. While his 
work includes the scientific and demythologizing tendencies of Ionian philosophical 
thinkers, he also explicitly situates his work within the genre of Greek poems (ἀοιδάων ἦι 
γένος Ἑλλαδικῶν, B6) and incorporates traditional poetic elements such as epic diction, 
the emphasis on seemliness, and a poetic persona. His conception of truth (τὸ σαφές, B34) 
depends on autopsy and personal experience; although these are privileged in the 
contemporary inquiry-based methods of Ionian thinkers, Homer also champions sense 
perception as a sure source of knowledge. There is a consistent balance in the work of 
Xenophanes between contemporary intellectual approaches and the traditional features in 
which he couches his innovative ideas. His authority is not based on inspiration or any 
other form of divine communication, but rather he uses traditional and new approaches to 
establish the worth of his observations.  
 The final chapter of my thesis will attempt to locate the innovations of 
Xenophanes by comparing his thoughts on the gods, truth, and authority with those of the 
(roughly) contemporary poets Parmenides and Pindar. The former is the alleged pupil of 
Xenophanes and like him adopts the language and images of epic poetry to express his 
own radical ideas on the nature of the gods and the universe. The latter poet consistently 
adopts a piously religious attitude in his poetry and shows interest in revising mythical 
accounts of gods and heroes found in Homer and other poetic predecessors. While these 
two authors reveal strikingly different purposes for their poems, they both confront and 
revise the traditional depictions of the gods and the universe found in epic tradition. 
Xenophanes’ conception of truth and the gods is more radical than Pindar’s pious 
revisions of earlier accounts, though not quite as radical as Parmenides’ abstract and 
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 logical system for determining the truth that, unlike Xenophanes’ emphasis on autopsy, 
has no precedent in the epic tradition. Nevertheless, Xenophanes differs from these two 
poets by his refusal to claim divine inspiration or communication as the source of his 
knowledge or authority.   
 The conclusions of this thesis are relevant for all those interested in the movement  
from a mythological understanding of the world to a logical one in ancient Greek  
literature. The gap between these two modes of thought is seen clearly in the works of  
Plato, who draws a sharp distinction between poetry and philosophy.3 Despite this view,  
authors who wrote in the centuries preceding the time of Plato did not see poetry and  
philosophy as mutually exclusive modes of expression. Writers such as Solon,  
Parmenides, and Empedocles use poetic language and images to express ideas that are  
frequently categorized as philosophical. Xenophanes is a particularly significant figure  
during the development of Greek thought in this period. Although his conception of the  
divine is predicated on a firm rejection of his poetic predecessors and contemporary  
religious customs, he nonetheless includes a number of traditional features in his poetry.  
For Xenophanes the poetic medium provided an ideal avenue for expressing innovative  
ideas to a general audience through language, themes, and values already familiar to  
them.  
                                                 
3 παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ (Rep. 607b5-6).
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CHAPTER I: GOD AND GODS IN XENOPHANES: THE DEVELOPMENT   
   OF A NEW THEOLOGY 
 
The nature and origin of Xenophanes’ conception of the gods are fraught with 
uncertainty and critical disagreement. Although there are a number of extant fragments 
that expound on a divine entity whose powers extend far beyond those of the gods found 
in his poetic predecessors, it is unclear how exactly this god fits into Xenophanes’ 
cosmological scheme and from where he derived the concept. Scholars have offered a 
variety of interpretations of his theological program: monotheism, refined polytheism, 
and pantheism have all been attributed to Xenophanes, although some have conceded that 
these distinctions are anachronistic and not necessarily mutually exclusive.4 The methods 
and approaches by which Xenophanes arrived at his pronouncements about the divine are 
equally under contention. While the fragments themselves suggest that he possessed an 
inductive mind, steeped in the tradition of Ionian autopsy and enquiry found in many of 
his philosophical predecessors, the later testimonial writers such as Simplicius and the 
author of De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia present Xenophanes as an abstract thinker who 
eschewed sense perception and relied rather on logical inference and deductive logic, as 
did his alleged pupil Parmenides. This chapter will explore the nature of Xenophanes’ 
conception of the divine and attempt to pinpoint the basis for his innovative comments.   
The fragments in which Xenophanes discusses the gods explicitly can be 
separated into two distinct groups: the critical fragments (B10-B17) contain attacks 
against the depictions of the gods in poetry and popular religion, the constructive 
                                                 
4 E.g. Voegelin 1957, 179;  Guthrie 1971, 1.375. 
 fragments (B23-B6) posit a unified conception of the divine radically different from the 
gods in popular and poetic representations. I will first examine the critical fragments in 
order to isolate key features of the gods that Xenophanes wishes to reject and revise; by 
indicating what the gods are not, Xenophanes is implying what his god is. The two most 
prominent criticisms are his attacks against the attribution of immoral behavior to the 
gods and the anthropomorphic representations of them. It is from these critiques that we 
can see the significance of moral purity and of a distinct divine nature for Xenophanes’ 
views on the gods.  
The Critical Fragments (B10-B17) 
 The poetry of Homer and Hesiod was an authoritative source on the nature of 
gods and the universe, for better or worse. As Adeimantus observes in Plato’s Republic: 
“If (the gods) do exist and do concern themselves with us, we’ve learned all we know 
about them from the laws and from the poets who give their genealogies - nowhere 
else”(365e1-3, trans. Grube). Xenophanes made a similar observation before Plato about 
the extent of their influence: ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ’ Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες (B10). 
Moreover, these poetic representations of the gods are as noxious as they are pervasive, 
inasmuch as Homer and Hesiod depict the gods as behaving immorally. Xenophanes 
notes:  
 πάντα θεοῖσ’ ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ’ Ἡσίοδός τε,
 ὅσσα παρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,
 κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν (B11).
 
The behavior of the gods in epic poetry is not consistent with the moral standards of 
human society. As Xenophanes notes, Homer and Hesiod do not hesitate to depict the 
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 gods as engaged in adultery,5 theft,6 deception,7  and other actions that are characteristic 
of criminal behavior. It seems distasteful to Xenophanes that the gods, who are the 
objects of worship for men, should act in ways scorned in everyday life.  
The epic “attribution” (ἀνέθηκαν ) of these crimes  is a perversion of the 
dedication (ἀνάθημα) that pious men should offer to the gods.   In the elegiac B1, 
Xenophanes begins by detailing the necessity for purity (καθαρόν, 1, 8) of the culinary 
instruments and setting during a feast; the cleanliness of the physical properties, however, 
must be matched by the purity of what is said during the feast (καθαροῖσι λόγοις, 14). The 
description of battles and conflict (μάχας…στάσιας σφεδανάς, 21-23) among the gods, 
titans, giants, and centaurs – events often detailed in epic poetry - are to be omitted as 
fictions (πλάσματα, 22 ) of former poets. These violent struggles offer nothing useful 
(χρηστόν, 23), whereas the man who reveals good things (ἐσθλὰ ἀναφαίνει, 19) deserves 
praise for his memory (μνημοσύνη, 20), consideration (προμηθείην, 24), and striving for 
virtue (τόνος ἀμφ’ ἀρετῆς , 20). The concept of  ἀρετή  is removed from its etymological 
connection with Ares and martial valor; instead, the good and the useful are associated 
with purity,  and thoughtful reverence and expression. The Xenophanean concept of 
divine purity, therefore, dictates that the gods avoid not only the sort of immoral activity 
that would incur blame among humans but also the violent and warlike behavior that 
often won praise among both gods and men.8  
                                                 
5 Cf. Ares and Aphrodite (Od. 8.266-366). 
 
6 Cf. Hermes’ theft of Apollo’s cattle in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 68-78. 
 
7 Cf. the recurrence of deception in the succession of the chief gods in Th. 154-210, 453-506. Zeus, in fact, 
maintains his authority by deceiving (ἐξαπατήσας ) and swallowing Metis (889). 
 
 7
  While Xenophanes’ attacks on the poetic representations of the gods focus on the 
unethical conduct found among them, his criticisms of popular religious thought and 
practice concentrate on the widespread anthropomorphism underlying most forms of 
divine understanding and representation. He notes:  
  ἀλλ’ οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεούς, 
τὴν σφετέρην δ’ ἐσθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε (B14). 
 
Men assume gods have human attributes such as “their own” (σφετέρην ) clothing, voice, 
and body, and moreover gods are presented as being born (γεννᾶσθαι). The precise 
meaning of “their own” here is ambiguous; is the reflexive possessive pronoun referring 
to the subject of the main verb (δοκέουσι), the men (i.e. that gods are depicted as having 
physical characteristics like the men who believe in them) or to the subject of the 
infinitive (ἔχειν), the gods themselves (i.e. that the gods have their own particular physical 
characteristics). Lesher opts for the latter, suggesting that the grammar does not privilege 
the first reading and notes: “It was a feature of Greek popular religion that the gods were 
thought to make themselves manifest to men through certain distinctive traits. These 
included exceptional beauty, unblinking eyes, a special fragrance, as well as special 
clothing, voices, and exceptional stature.”9  Xenophanes would thus be rejecting the 
possibility that gods come down to earth and assume a distinct corporeal form resembling 
an exaggerated human guise. This would be consistent with the pronouncement found in 
fragment B26 that it is not fitting for the gods to move to any other place (οὐδὲ 
μετέρχεσθαί μιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλληι). 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Although Homer and Hesiod do not hesitate to note the grim and gruesome nature of warfare, the victory 
of the epic protagonists Achilles (Iliad), Odysseus (Odyssey), and Zeus (Theogony) ultimately depends on 
the violent suppression of their enemies (Hector, the suitors, and Typhoeus, respectively).  
 
9 Lesher 1992, 88. 
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 While the gods do, as Lesher observes, often display these characteristic features 
when assuming a mortal guise,10 the rest of Xenophanes’ critical fragments suggest that 
he intended σφετέρην to refer to human features. Xenophanes observes:  
Αἰθίοπές τε <θεοὺς σφετέρους> σιμοὺς μέλανάς τε
Θρῆικές τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρρούς <φασι πέλεσθαι> (B16). 
 
Both the Ethiopians and the Thracians depict the gods as resembling themselves. There 
seems to be a contradiction here: unless the two races worship entirely different gods, it is 
impossible for the gods to look like Thracians and like Ethiopians. The human tendency 
to depict gods with the appearance of their believers results in this type of incongruity. 
Xenophanes further illustrates this point with a hypothetical premise:  
ἀλλ’ εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον βόες ἵπποι τ’  ἠὲ λέοντες  < >
ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες,  
    ἵπποι μέν θ’ ἵπποισι βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίας 
καί κε  θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ’ ἐποίουν  < >
   τοιαῦθ’ οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ἕκαστοι  (B15). < >
 
Xenophanes demonstrates the flaw in representing the gods as identical in form to the 
believer by positing a situation in which it is patently absurd. The image of animals 
creating artistic representations of themselves and their gods demonstrates an innate flaw 
in deriving the form of the divine from one’s own body: there is no logical limit that 
prevents the attribution of incongruous or ridiculous properties to objects of universal 
worship.11  
While anthropomorphic features such as clothing and hair color are closely 
related to the specific cultural norms of the believers in a particular region, Xenophanes 
                                                 
10 Cf. the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite 90-154, where Anchises quickly identifies Aphrodite as a goddess 
despite her disguise.  
 
11 The concept of gods in animal form is not common in Greek religion, aside from Zeus’ occasional 
metamorphoses.  Jaeger (1947, 47) notes that Xenophanes “was not aware that there were such animal gods 
in Egypt....” If Xenophanes’ audience had any awareness of Egyptian religious practice, it is likely that they 
considered it exotic and bizarre, if Herodotus’ wonder at it is any indication.  
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 also objects to universal human characteristics being attributed to the divine realm. In the 
first half of B14, Xenophanes observes that mortals assume that the gods are born 
(γεννᾶσθαι), an attribute not limited to any specific culture, nor indeed to any particular 
species. The gods are distinguished from human beings in poetry by their everlasting life; 
Homer and Hesiod frequently refer to the gods as ἀθάνατοι, αἰειγενέται and αἰὲν ἐόντες: 
undying, everlasting, and existing forever. While the first term implies only that the gods, 
unlike mortals, never experience death, the latter two suggest that the gods exist always.  
Hesiod, however, chronicles in detail the births of the gods in the Theogony and Homer 
makes many casual references to the gods’ lineage.12 Xenophanes, then, does not fault 
the poets and popular religion for labeling the gods as everlasting, but rather the 
inconsistency in attributing births to beings that exist forever; if the gods are to be distinct 
entities from mortal beings, they must completely transcend the cycle of life and death.   
  The moral arguments raised by Xenophanes against the poetry of Homer and 
Hesiod in B14 should also be considered in terms of anthropomorphism. The shameful 
and brutal activity of the gods as represented in epic poetry is objectionable not only 
because it attributes immorality to the divine realm, but also because it creates an 
equivalency between human and divine behavior. The specific crimes mentioned (theft, 
adultery, and deceit) are intrinsically human: the act of theft is usually committed because 
of some want or necessity, whereas the gods are traditionally represented as “living 
easily” (ῥεῖα ζώοντες);13 adultery is the violation of a human convention that is as 
inappropriate in the divine realm as clothing would be;  deception is typically employed 
when an object of desire cannot be obtained through legitimate means or by force, but the 
                                                 
12 E.g. Zeus is often called “the son of Kronos.” 
 
13 Il. 6.138, Od. 4.805. 
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 gods, if all powerful, need not resort to such tricks. Perhaps Xenophanes is suggesting 
here that while the thought of gods acting immorally is certainly distasteful, the 
attribution of moral significance to divine actions is absurd in a way similar to Aristotle’s 
observation in the Nicomachean Ethics: “If we go through the list we shall find that all 
forms of virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the gods.” (X.viii.7). Lesher 
astutely observes that we cannot affirm that Xenophanes had arrived at this Aristotelian 
understanding of the divine and that he may simply be rejecting immoral behavior 
without committing himself to rejecting all moral dimensions; it is unlikely that 
Xenophanes did not associate some form of moral goodness with the gods, especially 
since he advises banqueters to pray τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι πρήσσειν (B1.15-16). Nevertheless, 
it is reasonable to account for the anthropomorphic flaws as well as the unethical 
attributes in the specific crimes assigned to the gods by Homer and Hesiod.  
 We can gather from the critical fragments that Xenophanes’ conception of the 
divine was that of something pure, free from conflict and immorality, and independent of 
anthropomorphic features. Although this configuration is formulated in direct opposition 
to poetic and popular depictions of the gods, in many ways it remains quite traditional. 
The criticisms that Xenophanes raises often address logical contradictions without 
repudiating the core idea; for example, Xenophanes maintains the everlasting nature of 
the gods as found in Homer and Hesiod, but he eliminates the inconsistency found in 
their accounts by removing the concept of divine birth. The emergence of theodicy is a 
development found within the poetry of Homer and Hesiod; for example, at the beginning 
of the Odyssey Zeus remarks that humans unfairly assign the blame for all bad things to 
 11
 the gods (1.32-43). Similarly, Zeus in the Theogony is a civilizing and moral force; as 
Voegelin notes:  
The other gods are “earlier” gods because of their savage lusts, their 
tyrannical cruelties, and especially because of the uncivilized habit of 
swallowing their children in order to avoid an aristocratic sharing of rule 
among the immortals...Only Zeus puts an end to this dreary sequence; for, 
while his victory is won by force, it is held by the just distribution of his 
honorable share (time) to each of the immortals. 14  
  
The victory of Zeus, however, depends on brutal tactics similar to those of his cruel 
predecessors: in order to retain his authority he resorts to eating Metis (Theo. 886-900), 
just as his father Cronus swallows his own children (459-460). Xenophanes, then, is 
continuing the tradition of purifying the stories concerning the gods by removing all 
elements of “savage lusts” and “tyrannical cruelties.” 
The most radical feature of Xenophanes’ criticisms is his rejection of 
anthropomorphic representations of the divine. This element of his theology, though, is 
understandable after one confronts the contradictions that result from anthropomorphism, 
such as the incongruity between Thracian gods and Ethiopian gods. While there is room 
in the Greek pantheon for many gods, which might perhaps explain the existence of a 
variety of physical features, the existence of universal gods is already quite traditional; 
Homer, for example, has the Trojans and the Greeks praying to the same gods. The 
observation of the inconsistency and “vanity of such (physical) distinctions” was, as 
Jaeger notes, a foreseeable occurrence.15
 
 
                                                 
14 Voegelin 1957, 133. 
 
15 Jaeger 1947, 48. 
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 Xenophanes’ Positive Theology (B23-B26) 
 The positive theological fragments (B23-B26) seem far less understandable 
within the context of Greek religion. Xenophanes, in opposition to the varied depictions 
of gods mentioned earlier, argues:  
  εἷς θεός, ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος, 
    οὔτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος οὐδὲ νόημα (B23).
 
While the second line merely reiterates the rejection of anthropomorphic gods found in 
the critical fragments, the first line begins with the provocative εἷς θεός. The precise  
meaning of this expression, as Lesher notes, is unclear: is the εἷς acting as a predicate 
along with the other two adjectives in the fragment (i.e. “god is one, greatest, not like”) or 
merely as an attributive adjective (i.e. “one god is greatest, not like”)?16 The former 
reading incorporates the “exclusive sense”17 of εἷς found in Homer, notably εἷς κοίρανος 
ἔστω, εἷς βασιλεύς (Il. 2.204). On this reading, Xenophanes is arguing for the existence of 
only one god, greatest of all, utterly unlike men in either thought or body.  If this is the 
case, how can we account for the phrase θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι? The most frequent 
response of modern scholars is that this is a “polar expression” and does not explicitly 
advocate the existence of a plurality of gods.18 Heidel supports this claim by noting the 
presence of similar statements in other monotheistic religious texts, such as Hebrew 
scripture.19  
The denial of multiple gods would be quite radical in the context of the 
polytheistic tradition of Greek religion that existed before the time of Xenophanes and 
                                                 
16 Lesher 1992, 96.  
 
17 Classen 1989, 92. 
 
18 E.g. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (KRS) 1995, 170. 
 
19 Heidel 1943, 275. 
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 continued long afterwards; Hermann Fränkel, after calling Xenophanes’ theology a 
“militant monotheism,” notes that it had very little influence on the mainstream 
polytheistic tradition.20 That Xenophanes absolutely rejected the concept of a multitude 
of gods is, however, attested by several later sources. Pseudo-Plutarch mentions that 
Xenophanes argued against the existence of a divine hierarchy (ἡγεμονία), inasmuch as it 
would not be holy for the gods to be ruled (δεσπόζεσθαι).21 More problematic are 
testimonia that account for Xenophanes’ one god as the one (τὸ ἕν) - the universal essence 
that unifies the cosmos; Aristotle labels Xenophanes as the first “proponent of the one” 
(ἑνίσας)  and discusses him in the same section as he does Parmenides and Melissus, 
Eleatic monists (Metaphysics 986b.10-27).  In the same passage, Aristotle remarks that 
while Parmenides argued for the unity of the world by definition  (κατὰ τὸν λόγον) and 
Melissus argued unity in terms of material (κατὰ τὴν ὕλην), Xenophanes made no such 
distinction; instead, Xenophanes εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἓν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν. 
Xenophanes’ one god, in Aristotle’s analysis, thus seems to be the universe itself 
(οὐρανόν).  The doxographical tradition after Aristotle, including Theophrastus and his 
followers,22 continues to regard Xenophanes as a monist who argues that everything is 
one and that the one is god.  These interpreters do not suggest that Xenophanes was 
strictly speaking a monotheist, but rather a pantheist. Burnett observes: “What 
                                                 
20  Fränkel 1975, 332. 
 
21 Strom. 4; Fr. A 32. 
 
22 e.g. Simplicius, Pseudo-Plutarch, the author of the De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia, etc. Cf. Finkelberg 
1990 for a thorough attempt at reconstructing Theophrastus’ main arguments concerning Xenophanes’ 
philosophy. 
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 Xenophanes is really concerned to deny is the existence of any gods in the proper sense, 
and the words ‘One god’ mean ‘No god but the world.’”23
There are some difficulties, however, in reading B23 as claim for the existence of 
only one god, whether it be equivalent to the universe or not. The presence of μέγιστος 
indicates that εἷς does not carry an exclusive sense; the use of εἷς with the superlative is 
also found in Homer (εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος, Il. 12.243) and there it means simply “one 
best.”24  Moreover, the “polar expression” in the first line still creates difficulties; if 
Xenophanes wished to pronounce the existence of a single god, why would he use an 
expression that would only serve to muddle his point? As Guthrie, who favors a pantheist 
reading, concedes, this is “suprising carelessness.”25 Xenophanes also refers to gods in 
the plural in other fragments. Burnett argues that the “the language of polytheism” is 
natural in the elegaic fragments and that other instances of polytheistic references are 
found when Xenophanes is describing the flaws of epic poetry, which typically represents 
the divine as a plurality of gods.26 While it is true that Xenophanes often refers to the 
gods in the plural when attacking the representations of poets and popular religion (e.g. 
B14.1, B15.1, B16.1), he also frequently mentions gods where no immediate criticism is 
apparent (B1.24, B18.1, B34.2). Furthermore, Xenophanes is consistent in rejecting the 
epic representations of the gods in the elegiac fragments (πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων, B1.22), 
so there is no reason to expect that his desire to adopt traditional language would trump 
his interest in promoting a true understanding of the divine. At any rate, whether this one 
                                                 
23 Burnet 1930, 128. 
 
24 Stokes 1971, 77-79. 
 
25 Guthrie 1971, 1.375. 
 
26 Burnet 1930, 128-129. 
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 god is the only god or whether it is the greatest among many, Xenophanes opts to discuss 
it exclusively in several fragments.  
 The nature of the god’s preeminence (μέγιστος) is also unclear; the adjective μέγας 
can refer to size, strength, and degree, among other things.27  Presumably the god’s 
greatness is located within the fields of honor and might, which are the common 
attributes that are associated with Zeus when he is called μέγιστος in Homer and Hesiod.28 
The god is universal and omnipotent, since it moves everything (πάντα κραδαίνει, B26).  It 
is also possible that Xenophanes is using μέγιστος spatially; he does not present an 
incorporeal god, but rather one who is unlike mortals “in respect to body,” (δέμας).29 
Although Xenophanes is clearly not attributing to his one god the same immense human 
form possessed by the gods in epic poetry, it is not unreasonable to assume that his god, 
since it apparently has some spatial dimensions, possesses a size analogous to its power.  
 The other fragments put more emphasis, however, on the god’s cognitive and 
perceptive attributes (νόημα) than on its physical form (δέμας).  Unlike human beings, who 
have distinct organs for the purpose of thought and perception, Xenophanes’ one god 
performs these functions as a whole (οὖλος, B24). The term οὖλος invites a number of 
critical questions, notably whether the god’s “wholeness” means homogeneity (that is a 
total lack of internal diversity). This question is markedly more complicated if one 
assumes that Xenophanes’ god is the universe; there is an immediate incongruity between 
the visibly differentiable world and the notion of a materially uniform universe. 
                                                 
27 cf. LSJ s.v. μέγας
 
28 Lesher (1992, 99-100) details the connection between μέγιστος, κράτος, and κῦδος.
 
29 Clement thus seems to be incorrect when he introduces Xenophanes’ god as ἀσώματος; although one 
could argue that it is possible to interpret “unlike in body” as “without body,” the description of a stationary 
divine nature as opposed to a locomotive one in B26 seems, as Lesher (1992, 100) argues, “inconceivable 
as a description of a being existing in a completely non-spatial way.” 
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 Finkelberg observes that it is unlikely that Xenophanes explicitly argued for a 
homogenous god since, had he mentioned this, Aristotle would have been able to 
categorize Xenophanes’ monism as κατὰ τὴν ὕλην.30  
There is, however, little doubt that Xenophanes’ one god does not have the same 
internal distinctions that humans have; there is a unity found in its cognitive and 
perceptive faculties and these are also linked to the god’s efficient powers. Xenophanes 
mentions that his god ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει (B25).  Just as the god 
perceives “as a whole,” so do its mental faculties have the power to move (literally 
“shake,” κραδαίνει) elements within the world (πάντα) as well as observe them. The brief 
fragment combines the notions of perception, thought, and action into a fluid process. 
The god’s powers reside in “the mind of its mind” (νόου φρενί), an image that is abstract 
and difficult to imagine. The νόος and the φρήν are two separate organs that have 
particular perceptive and cognitive functions. The νόος traditionally is associated with the 
function of perceiving and processing information; in Homer, the verb νοεῖν is often 
connected with sight, but von Fritz notes that the “most original meaning...seemed to 
have been ‘to realize or to understand a situation.’”31 The φρήν is generally associated 
with more deliberative forms of mental activity; the Homeric hero often considers and 
ponders κατὰ φρένα.32 The one god does not have distinct organs of perception and 
deliberation, but rather can accomodate both feats in its νόου φρήν; the normal human 
                                                 
30  Finkelberg 1990, 117-118. Finkelberg also notes that only two sources mention the homogeneity of 
Xenophanes’ god, both of which are post-Aristotelian and not likely to have a more comprehensive text 
than Aristotle did.  
 
31 von Fritz (1943) 93. 
 
32 Cf. Cunliffe 1963 s.v. φρήν III.2b and φρονέω 6-9. It should be noted that the hero often deliberates both 
in his mind (κατὰ φρένα), and in his “heart” (κατὰ θυμόν), where the θυμός  perhaps represents the emotive 
function of will and purpose (as Snell 1943, 11-15 argues, though he admits that the distinction between 
head and heart is often blurred even in Homer). 
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 sequence of perceiving a situation, deliberating, and then reacting to the situation is thus 
seamlessly (ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο) integrated into one simultaneous intellectual process.   
 The lack of effort involved in the one god’s comprehensive cognitive process is 
also related to its static nature. Xenophanes argues that it is “unfitting” (οὐδέ...ἐπιπρέπει) 
for the god to move (κινούμενος, μετέρχεσθαι), and so it remains motionless in the same 
place (B 26).  The absence of motion is a radical departure from the presentation of gods 
in Homer who frequently travelled down to earth to influence the behavior of humans; 
Xenophanes’ god needs not move at all to shake (κραδαίνει) the world, whereas even 
Zeus, who can shake the heavens while seated on his throne, accomplishes his will 
through the physical movement of nodding his head.33  There is also the possibility that 
Xenophanes is not only rejecting divine locomotion, but also divine change, inasmuch as 
movement is closely related to change in Greek philosophy.34 While, as Finkelberg notes, 
this is an anachronistic interpolation of a later, metaphorical usage of κίνησις, the absence 
of locomotion and toil is essentially “tantamount to freedom from all kinds of movement 
including change.”35  
 The constructive theological fragments are consistent with the conceptions of the 
divine implicit in the critical fragments. Xenophanes argues against anthropomorphism, 
impurity, and conflict in the realm of the divine in the critical fragments; in these positive 
fragments he postulates a god who is unlike mortals in body or mind, whose universal 
power and influence (μέγιστος, B23; πάντα κραδαίνει, B25) is thoroughly grounded in its 
                                                 
33 Il. 1.530; cf. Guthrie (1971, 374), who notes that Xenophanes is most likely alluding to this passage in 
the Iliad. 
 
34 Fränkel 1975, 332. 
 
35 Finkelberg 1990, 109-110. 
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 particular intellectual process, and who does not suffer from any sort of external strife 
(i.e. from gods of equal power, who don’t exist) or internal conflict (i.e. from distinct 
organs of perception and deliberation).  The rejection of anthropomorphism is echoed in 
the dissimilarity between the greatest god and mortal men in terms of body and mind, and 
the insistence on purity is implicit in the stationary and intellectual nature of the one god; 
it would be impossible for this divine entity to be engaged in any sort of illicit behavior 
inasmuch it is unfitting (οὐδὲ...ἐπιπρέπει) for it to leave its particular domain.  
The nature of the god’s unity is the most problematic element in Xenophanes’ 
positive theological remarks. While it is clear that the oneness of god is a crucial element 
in his interpretation of the divine, he does not explicitly note whether this god coexists 
with lesser and subordinate gods, or whether this is the only god, or whether this one god 
is the universe itself. Aristotle’s remark that Xenophanes did not make clear (οὐδὲν 
διεσαφήνισεν, Meta. 986b.22-23) the nature of his monistic theory indicates that the 
uncertainty concerning the nature of Xenophanean divine unity arose very early in the 
philosophical tradition.36 That his conception of the divine was unified, however, is 
perhaps more important than labeling it with distinctions that are in danger of being 
anachronistic. The question of monotheism or polytheism, as Guthrie notes, “never had 
the same prominence in the Greek mind” as they did for other religions such as 
Christianity and Judaism.37 In labeling Xenophanes with these distinctions, we must 
assume “that a thinker is obliged to make up his mind about his adherence to one or the 
                                                 
36 Finkelberg (1990, 111), however, notes the extent of the doxography and declares that the equivalence 
between Xenophanes’ one god and the universe is “one of the best attested Presocratic conceptions, and 
anyone who seeks to dismiss it must be prepared to face this fact.” See my discussion below concerning the 
unreliability of the doxographic tradition.  
 
37 Guthrie 1971, 1.375. 
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 other of the mutually exclusive systems.”38 The unity of this one god and its universality 
are the most striking features of Xenophanes’ conception of the divine, and it would 
therefore be unsurprising if Xenophanes did not, as Aristotle noted, give a more detailed 
definition of its features. Even if he had made implicit or explicit comments on this 
question, those who transmitted Xenophanes’ work, which was woefully incomplete very 
early on, may not have fretted over preserving details in which Aristotle and later 
scholars would have had great interest.  
Although a correlation between the critical fragments and constructive theological 
ones is evident, the nature of their connection needs to be explicated: how exactly did 
Xenophanes devise his unified theological program? Do his critical fragments provide the 
basis for his positive comments, or, on the contrary, do his attacks against the poets and 
popular religion follow after he had developed his unified conception of the divine? Just 
as there is scholarly disagreement over the nature of Xenophanes’ one god, there is also a 
major critical rift concerning the methods by which he conceived of this divine unity. 
Although there are many different interpretations of Xenophanes’ methodology, the two 
most prominent approaches portray Xenophanes as either an inductive thinker relying on 
personal experience and inferences drawn from autopsy, much like his Ionian 
predecessors and contemporaries, or a more deductive thinker who eschews the 
conclusions drawn from sense perception and relies on more abstract and logical forms of 
argumentation, as did his alleged student Parmenides. The former interpretation relies 
primarily on the extant fragments, while the latter depends more on the doxographical 
tradition. I will first examine Xenophanes’ use of inductive methods and their application 
                                                 
38 Voegelin 1957, 179. 
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 in his conception of the divine before I will address the possibility of his reliance on 
deductive argumentation. 
Xenophanes the Inductive Thinker 
Xenophanes’ inductive and empirical tendencies are evident in fragment B18, 
which seems to contain a justification for an inductive approach and might well be a 
programmatic statement for his methods of examination: 
 οὔτοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ’ ὑπέδειξαν, 
 ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον. (B 18)  
 
Though the fragment is only two lines long, it contains many ambiguities: what 
beginning (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς) is Xenophanes talking about? Will the gods eventually reveal 
(ὑπέδειξαν) everything to mortals? Do they reveal some things, but not everything (πάντα)? 
What is the function of “better” (ἄμεινον)?  From these and other uncertainties Lesher 
postulates seventy-two possible readings of this fragment.39 Despite these doubts, it is 
clear that a contrast is drawn between the absence of complete divine revelation in the 
first line and the existence of improvement by human inquiry (ζητοῦντες). The nature of 
this “improvement” (ἄμεινον) needs clarification, since our impressions of Xenophanes’ 
empiricism depend on how seeking and discovering relate to “better.” Some have 
suggested that ἄμεινον is adverbial and means “progressively better.”40 This is a plausible 
interpretation given the presence of χρόνωι (we were ignorant in the beginning, but as time 
goes on we discover better and better conclusions), but one that perhaps overextends the 
uses of the Greek comparative.41 Lesher argues that ἄμεινον here seems to mean “a 
                                                 
39 Lesher 1991, 231. 
 
40 Theodor Gomperz (1973, 1.132) translates B18 “Zeigten die Götter den Sterblichen doch nicht Alles von 
Anfang, Sondern suchend finden sie selbst allmählich das Bessre” (emphasis mine). 
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 better”: while inquiry is not perfect method that will reveal the truth about everything, it 
is the better alternative to trusting in divine signs that from the outset have not existed.42 
This interpretation seems preferable, especially since Xenophanes uses the comparative 
in other fragments to present the better of two alternatives;43 the two alternatives in this 
fragment are divine revelation and induction based on inquiry. 
The benefits of an inductive approach are predicated on the impossibility of 
divine revelation; although Xenophanes posits that his god influences the world (πάντα 
κραδαίνει, B25), he rejects the possibility that it has revealed (ὑπέδειξαν, B18) information 
to mortals. Lesher observes that the addition of the ὑπό prefix attaches a discreet element 
to the verb δείκνυμι, and therefore he translates it as “to show or display in a secretive, 
partial, or indirect manner.”44 It was commonly thought that the gods did communicate 
with men through discreet and often ambiguous signs and omens and that the science of 
divination could interpret these messages. Heraclitus observed that Apollo οὔτε λέγει οὔτε 
κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει (B93).   
Xenophanes rejects the existence of these discreet signs and offers inquiry as a 
more viable option of obtaining information. It is perhaps not coincidental that 
Xenophanes, as a “hard-headed empiricist,”45 observes that the rainbow, the one mortals 
call Iris, is actually a cloud (B32); in doing so he not only provides a rational explanation 
based on experience for a natural phenomenon, he also strips the rainbow of its 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Cf. Tulin 1992, 130-1 for a brief discussion of this interpretation and its history. 
 
42 Lesher 1991, 242-247. 
 
43 In B2 Xenophanes remarks that his wisdom is better than the athletic prowess of other men (...ῥώμης γὰρ  
ἀμείνων / ἀνδρῶν ἠδ’ ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη).
 
44 Lesher 1991, 237. 
 
45 Mourelatos 1965, 350. 
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 association with a divine messenger who often relayed messages from the gods to the 
world of mortals. Lesher remarks on this fragment:  
These two lines of Fr. 32 embody, in a remarkably compressed way, the 
intellectual revolution Xenophanes and his fellow Ionian physiologoi 
initiated: nature is not a bulletin board displaying cryptic signals from 
deities, it is a realm of physical realities to be described, named, and 
classified in terms of their perceptible qualities, and understood entirely in 
terms  of ordinary natural substances and forces.”46    
 
These empirical and inductive methods are a consistent feature in Xenophanes’ natural 
philosophy. Hippolytus remarks that Xenophanes used his discovery of shells on inland 
mountains and impressions of fish in quarries in Syracuse as “proofs” (ἀποδείξεις) for his 
theory that nature is mixture of earth and water.47 This testimonium is perhaps 
corroborated by fragment B37, in which Xenophanes claims that water drips down in 
some caves.48 Many of Xenophanes’ comments on natural phenomena are based on 
empirical conclusions; for example, he notes that the sun travels over the earth and 
warms it (B31), which seems like an obvious and unremarkable conclusion.  Fränkel 
faults Xenophanes’ “strong empirical tendency” in his natural philosophy, noting that, 
aside from the fossil example cited above, his descriptions of the physical world are 
“forced and unconvincing” and that “everything is explained on the basis of everyday 
experience, and every effort is made to prevent any considerable widening of our ideas 
concerning the world about us.”49 Fränkel’s assertion that Xenophanes’ empirical 
                                                 
46 Lesher 1991, 241. 
 
47 Hippolytus Ref. 1.14.5; Fr. A33. It should be noted here, however, that doxography concerning 
Xenophanes is contaminated by anachronistic attributions and is often sketchy; Hippolytus, for example, 
also attributes to Xenophanes a spherical god and Parmenidean conceptions of Being, both of which are 
highly unlikely, in the same fragment. For more on the doxographical tradition, cf. Lesher 1992, 189-196; 
KRS 1995, 165-6; Finkelberg 1990. I address the Eleatic/rationalist view of Xenophanes’ theology below. 
 
48 KRS 1995, 176-178. 
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 methods lead to simplistic and reductive results is perhaps supported by a testimonium 
from Hippolytus (Ref. 1.14.3; fr. A33): Xenophanes seems to have claimed that the sun is 
generated anew every day (γίνεσθαι καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν), an observation which resonates 
with personal experience but is logically unsound. 
Although Xenophanes’ empirical tendencies so far have been shown to be quite 
prominent, the use of inductive methods to construct a theology is problematic. Fragment 
B34 illustrates the problem: 
 καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται 
 εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·  
 εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών, 
 αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται. 
 
This fragment complicates the prospect of a theology based on autopsy and inference. On 
the one hand, we would expect a thinker so fond of empirical methods to use them 
systematically; on the other hand, Xenophanes seems in this fragment to adopt a sceptical 
position that calls into question the potential for an inductive method to illuminate 
material that is beyond complete human understanding. Even a staunch empiricist might 
forego a technique based on evidence-gathering and experience in examining a realm 
that, according to him, would never be known certainly (σαφές) and could only be 
determined through supposition (δόκος). 
Later thinkers have attributed various different degrees of scepticism to 
Xenophanes, from a complete disavowal of understanding, as Sotion appears to have 
said,50 to a general distrust of sense perception, as Pseudo-Plutarch and perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                 
49 Fränkel 1975, 334. 
 
50 Diogenes Laertius claims φησὶ δὲ Σωτίων πρῶτον αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πάντα (A1.20). It is 
possible that Sotion is misinterpreting Xenophanes’ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων, as though Xenophanes were 
denying that anything that he said could be understood certainly instead of everything that he said. Guthrie 
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 Theophrastus suggest.51 Xenophanes’ own words, however, do not appear to support 
either of these positions: the primary obstacle to clear knowledge is not the fallibility of 
the senses nor the absence of a sure criterion for judgment, but the limited extent of 
human experience. The essence of this problem is illustrated in fragment B38:  
 εἰ μὴ χλωρὸν ἔφυσε θεὸς μέλι, πολλὸν ἔφασκον  
    γλύσσονα σῦκα πέλεσθαι.  
 
The human conception of sweetness is limited to what particular foods are available at a 
certain place and time. If someone were to ask us what food was the sweetest, we could 
not answer absolutely; the problem is not that our tongues are untrustworthy gauges of 
sweetness, nor that the criterion for judgment in this matter is uncertain (for we can say 
certainly that ice cream is sweeter than a pickle), but rather that we have had a very 
limited experience with food (e.g. there may be sweeter pastries in remote regions that we 
have not yet visited, there may have been or will be a time when sweeter foods were or 
are produced, etc.).  Similarly, our understanding of the divine  is necessarily reduced to 
supposition because it exists outside the domain of human experience. As Xenophanes 
has noted earlier, the gods do not in any way communicate with mortals and mortals do 
not have any other avenues through which they can experience and make inductive 
inferences about the divine. The wording in B34 illustrates this dilemma: mortals do not 
have certain understanding because they cannot see (ἴδεν) or have knowledge based on 
sight (εἰδώς) of the gods; although  οἶδα does not always bear connotations of visual 
experience, the parallel ἴδεν on the previous line suggests that we should honor the 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1971, 396) notes that Sotion’s reading “depends to some extent on a misunderstanding of certain words 
which had acquired a different shade of meaning by the time they were quoted.”  
 
51 Ps.-Plutarch writes ἀποφαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ψευδεῖς καὶ καθόλου σὺν αὐταῖς καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον 
διαβάλλει (A32.6-7). Finkelberg (1990, 160-162) argues that Ps.-Plutarch contains accurate (i.e. not 
contaminated with other traditions), albeit garbled, transmissions of Theophrastus’ writing.
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 etymological connection between the two verbs. Xenophanes, then, as Fränkel notes, is 
specifically rejecting “only a knowing rooted in vision, or at least in experience.”52
The remoteness of the gods from mortal experience presents a significant obstacle 
to inductive understanding of the divine. It is, however, worth noting that arguing the 
limitations of empiricism does not necessarily constitute a complete denial of its 
relevance in the pursuit of theology. Though we may never see or know anything σαφές 
about the gods, we can formulate suppositions (δόκος). These beliefs, while inferior to 
certain knowledge, are superior to groundless assertions and are not to be categorically 
rejected. While in B34 Xenophanes concedes that he cannot offer any clear and certain 
truths about the gods or the universe, he asserts in B35 (which, as Lesher notes, is likely 
the logical complement of B34)53 that his opinions should be regarded as “like truth” 
(ταῦτα δεδοξάσθω μὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι). While the gods themselves lie outside the 
realm of human experience, Xenophanes can formulate suppositions concerning the 
divine that resemble truth (ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι, B35) and are a better alternative to 
traditional beliefs in divine communication (B18) . His attempt to construct a positive 
theology would then depend on examining what the divine is not, taking inconsistent and 
poorly reasoned religious beliefs as evidence against those interpretations.  
The argument for an inductive method in Xenophanes’ theology in its most basic 
form is summarized well by McKirahan: 
Xenophanes proceeds in the following way. First, collect a wide variety of 
beliefs on the  topic... Second, note where these beliefs agree and where 
they disagree.... Third, identify a principle which accounts for the 
disagreement.... Fourth, eliminate the absurdities and inconsistencies, to 
see if there remains a core of truth on which to base a new theory.... And 
                                                 
52 Fränkel 1974, 123. 
 
53 Lesher 1992, 171-176. 
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 finally, develop a theory which is based not on uncritical acceptance of 
tradition, but on critical reflection in accordance with rational criteria. 54
 
Naturally, then, an empirical model will begin with Xenophanes’ criticisms of poetic and 
popular representations of the gods. I have already noted the contradiction that exists in 
fragment B16:  
Αἰθίοπές τε <θεοὺς σφετέρους> σιμοὺς μέλανάς τε 
Θρῆικές τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρρούς <φασι πέλεσθαι>. 
 
The Thracian and Ethiopian depictions of the gods are incongruous; it is impossible for 
the gods to have the features of both the Thracians and the Ethiopians. Furthermore, 
Xenophanes’ choice of examples suggests that he is drawing on wider experiential 
knowledge than the mere contrast of these two particular peoples. He generalizes the 
dilemma by selecting ethnic groups located at opposite extremes of the known world; the 
implication is that across the globe depictions of the gods differ in correlation to the 
varied physical appearances of their believers. The desire to present the gods as 
physically similar to those who believe in them is endemic to all humans, from the 
extreme north to the extreme south.  
After observing the various representations of the divine and noting the 
differences, did Xenophanes formulate a principle that accounted for these discrepancies? 
The fragments suggest that he had developed an argument against the “genetic fallacy,” 
which Lesher defines as “inferring the falsity of a belief from its disreputable origins.”55 
In this case, Xenophanes observes that the common tendency to represent the gods with 
human features is based on an ungrounded assumption of the equivalence between the 
form of the believer and the form of the god. Despite the widespread belief that the gods 
                                                 
54 McKirahan 1989, 243. 
 
55 Lesher 1992, 87. 
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 communicate with human beings through omens and divination, the practitioners and 
authorities of popular religion do not demonstrate any knowledge of the divine that could 
not have been gleaned from human experience; the gods act and appear as though they 
were humans: they have desires and passions, exist within familial and political 
structures, and physically resemble their human followers. 
The disreputable origins of a belief do not, as Lesher observes, necessarily mean 
that the conclusions themselves are false, since one can accidentally speak the truth 
(B34.3-4).56 These weak premises, however, indicate that the believer does not have 
adequate or justifiable cause for his or her beliefs. For example, many who claim to have 
experienced an encounter with an extraterrestrial life form describe the alien with (often 
exaggerated) humanoid features; that such an alien creature resembles the human form or 
can be derived from popular science fiction does not necessarily contradict their claims, 
but it casts suspicion on their experience and raises rational doubts concerning the source 
of their knowledge.  Xenophanes illustrates the flaws in the anthropomorphic tendencies 
of humans by extending this practice to the animal world in B15.The reductio ad 
absurdum effectively demonstrates the underlying problems with the attribution of one’s 
own traits to the gods; if the gods are depicted as mere reflections of their followers, there 
is no logical means of determining what characteristics are appropriate and preventing 
such ridiculous situations.  
Xenophanes seems to suggest that he genetic fallacy of anthropomorphizing the 
divine among his contemporaries has it roots in the Homeric and Hesiodic depictions of 
the gods, inasmuch as popular religion owes a very great debt to their teachings (B10). 
The gods are consistently represented as having human appearance and engaging in 
                                                 
56 Lesher 1992, 93-94. 
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 mortal behavior. Zeus has shaggy hair and dark eyebrows (Il. 1.528-530), Hephaestus 
suffers from lameness (Od. 8.300), and adjectives such as καλλιπάρῃος and καλλιπλόκαμος 
are used to describe women as well as goddesses.57 The gods, furthermore, fight on the 
battlefield with the human warriors and are occasionally wounded (Il. 5.846-863), they 
are susceptible to seduction (Il. 14.153-353), and, as Xenophanes observes in B11, they 
often act in ways considered immoral among humans in pursuit of their desires and 
interests. He reads these fundamentally anthropomorphic representations of the gods as 
indications of an unjustified and flawed understanding of the divine; Homer and Hesiod 
draw on human experience and attribute human traits to divine figures, with the result 
that the gods seem to act in ways incongruous with their position of honor among 
mortals.  
Xenophanes’ use of inductive reasoning is in some ways similar to the methods 
used by the poets and the followers of popular religion: both draw on human experiences 
and apply them to the realm of the divine. Xenophanes’ approach, however, offers two 
significant advantages: first, he does not accept all forms of human behavior as 
appropriate to the world of the divine, but rather critically examines the world, eliminates 
inconsistencies and impurities from his observations, and then infers what traits are likely 
to belong to the gods; secondly, he does not offer certain (σαφές) propositions, but rather 
suppositions like the truth (B35) which are a better alternative to the accounts of poets 
and religious authorities (B18). In this empirical approach, the intellectual nature, 
unmoving position, and unity of the one god are suppositions that eliminate the 
inconsistencies and incongruities found in the traditional representations of the gods. In 
short, Xenophanes’ god is free from the problems that he finds among the 
                                                 
57 Cunliffe 1963 s.v. καλλιπάρῃος and καλλιπλόκαμος. 
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 anthropomorphic deities in literature and in culture: inconsistency, insufficiency, and 
discord.   
Xenophanes, Deductive Argumentation, and the Doxographical Tradition 
Although strong empirical tendencies can be found in some of his fragments, we 
must confront the portrait of the Xenophanes in fragments B23-26 as “all dogma and all 
flat assertion.” 58 None of these fragments draws on empirical methods explicitly, and 
readers in antiquity detected a fervor and certainty in these fragments far removed from 
limitations of human knowledge concerning the divine found in fragment B34.59 If 
Xenophanes wanted to convey that his critical observations provided the basis for his 
positive theological commentary, he could have further developed his argumention in 
these attacks on anthropomorphism60 and then later made the connection between these 
two groups much clearer; as it is, there is much evidence to support that Xenophanes’ 
conception of the divine was consistent in the critical and constructive fragments, but 
there is little trace in the fragments themselves of a strong causal connection between the 
two.    
 Later doxographical writers suggest that Xenophanes derived his concept of the 
divine from a number of deductive arguments using inferences based not on sense 
experience and induction but rather on abstracted logical premises.  The pseudo-
                                                 
58 Lesher 1992, 116. 
 
59 e.g. Sextus’ remark that Timon called Xenophanes only “partly free of conceit” (ὑπάτυφος) because he 
positively asserted (ἐδογμάτιζε) that everything was one (fr. 831; fr. A35). Finkelberg (1990, 129-130) 
observes that Timon, a philosopher who admired the sceptical  attitude of Xenophanes, would have 
preferred to regard him as consistently sceptical and so his concession is an indication that Xenophanes was 
more dogmatic and less cautious in his positive remarks. The “scepticism” of Xenophanes is, however, not 
quite what later sceptical thinkers had developed (as I have noted above).   
 
60 Lesher (1992, 92-94) notes that in B16 Xenophanes does not phrase the contrast of the Ethiopian and 
Thracian gods in such a way as to emphasize the contradiction (i.e. by selecting the same traits differing 
among particular tribes) and suggests that Xenophanes is not making arguments but rather observations. 
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 Aristotelian document De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia (A28) presents several of these 
logical arguments. While some of them endorse conclusions that can be found in the 
fragments, such as the impossibility of divine generation and the one god being the 
strongest of all (977a), others promote theories that appear to be distinctly post-
Xenophanean, such as the god’s sphericity (977b). Such arguments reflect the structure 
and content of Parmenides’ arguments for the unity of “Being.”61  
The later testimonia suffer from various types of corruption, but the most 
significant source of confusion is the “Parmenidization” of Xenophanes’ philosophy. 
Xenophanes is associated with Parmenides and the Eleatic school early in the 
philosophical tradition. Plato remarks that the Eleatic tribe “began with Xenophanes and 
even earlier” (Soph. 242c-d; fr.A29) and Aristotle notes that Xenophanes was said to be 
Parmenides’ teacher ( Meta. 986b; fr. A30).  The nature of the relationship between these 
two thinkers is uncertain; while it is probable that Parmenides drew some inspiration 
from Xenophanes, the extent of that influence is exaggerated by the tendency of 
doxographers to fit thinkers into the “teacher-student” model of philosophical 
succession.62 The range of scholarly opinion on this matter is vast: some see a very weak  
relationship between the two, 63 while  others argue that Parmenides’ thought is 
fundamentally grounded in Xenophanes’ work.64 The sophisticated language and 
argumentation found in Parmenides’ writing seem far removed from the ideas found in 
                                                 
61 Cf. fr. B8 in the Parmenides section of Diels-Kranz. 
 
62 Cf. KRS 1995, 4-5. 
 
63 Such as KRS (1995, 165), who claim that the connection between the two “obviously depends on the 
superficial similarity between motionless one deity of the former and the motionless sphere of Being in the 
latter.”  
 
64 Finkelberg (1990, 166) argues that “it would be hard to point out even one important Parmenidean 
doctrine which is not, in one way or another, rooted in Xenophanes’ teaching.”  
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 Xenophanes’ poetry. Although several of Xenophanes’ fragments include ambiguous 
statements65 and unconventional terms,66 nothing in his work approaches Parmendides’ 
χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, / μηδὲν δ’οὐκ ἔστιν (B6.1-2). There are, 
however, instances of inferential thinking in Xenophanes’ work, such as the hypothetical 
predictions in B15 and B34. While these appear to be based on autoptic experience (the 
incongruity of ethnic representations of the gods; the limits of empirical knowledge), is it 
possible that Xenophanes formed inferential arguments based on logical premises, as 
well?  
Finkelberg argues that there is no reason to assume that Xenophanes was 
incapable of employing logical proofs;67 Kahn has argued that this method of 
argumentation can be found as early as Anaximander,68 with whom Xenophanes is said 
to have studied.69 If Xenophanes did use deductive syllogisms and proofs, it is difficult to 
detect these authentic arguments from the Parmenidean influence in the doxography; of 
the six arguments attributed to Xenophanes in the MXG, Finkelberg concedes that only 
one (for the existence of one god) can possibly be traced back to Xenophanes.70 
Finkelberg, however, conjectures that a true argument of Xenophanes can be found Ps. 
Plutarch’s Stromateis:  
ἀλλ’ εἶναι λέγει τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ ὅμοιον· εἰ γὰρ γίγνοιτο τοῦτο, φησίν, ἀναγκαῖον 
πρὸτούτου μὴ εἶναι· τὸ μὴ ὂν δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ μὴ ὂν ποιήσαι τι οὔτε 
                                                 
65 E.g. the εἷς θεός in B23 and several terms in B18, as noted by Lesher 1991. 
 
66 E.g.  νόου φρήν (B25). 
 
67 Finkelberg 1990, 136. 
 
68 Kahn 1958 passim.  
 
69 As Theophrastus wrote, according to Diogenes Laertius (Vit. Phil. 9.21; fr. A2). 
 
70 Finkelberg 1990, 137. 
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 ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γένοιτ’ ἄν τι (A 32.3-6, bolded words are omitted or 
altered by Finkelberg). 
   
This deductive proof for the ungenerated nature of the god (τὸ πᾶν - the equivalence 
between god and the universe is consistent in the later doxography) is, as Finkelberg 
argues, based on the account of Theophrastus, who is likely to have had access to a 
version of Xenophanes’ text free from Parmenidean contamination.71 There are, however, 
a number of details that complicate this interpretation: first, Finkelberg replaces οὐδ’ with 
οὐτ’ and removes the articles (in bold), on the grounds that the article was a sporadic 
phenomenon in poetry and that this would have been a natural addition by later 
doxographers;72 secondly, Ps. Plutarch inserts this argument into the section covering 
Xenophanes’ physical doctrine, which would imply that even if this were found in 
Theophrastus there is some “doxagraphical confusion” regarding its context.73 Although 
Finkelberg diligently attempts to cull reliable information from these later writers, the 
doxography is too corrupt and contaminated with later ideas and methods to be treated as 
a reliable source in this matter.  It is clear that many of these later writers based their 
accounts on the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus and, moreover, that they often 
misconstrue these sources; for example, Simplicius argues that Xenophanes asserted that 
god was neither finite nor infinite (οὔτε δὲ ἄπειρον οὔτε πεπερασμένον εἶναι, A31), which is 
clearly a misreading of Aristotle who says that Xenophanes did not make clear (οὐδὲν 
διεσαφήνισεν, A30) whether his god was finite or infinite. 
                                                 
71 Finkelberg 1990, 137-146. 
 
72 Finkelberg 1990, 141. 
 
73 Finkelberg 1990, 138. 
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  The account of Xenophanes in Aristotle, as we have seen, indicates that if he did 
make arguments supporting and explaining the nature of his one god, Aristotle either did 
not have access to them or did not deem them worthy of discussion.74 Perhaps 
Xenophanes’ theology, as Jaeger suggests, “is not really philosophical at all, but springs 
from an immediate sense of awe at the sublimity of the divine.”75  The emphasis on what 
is seemly (ἐπιπρέπει, B26) suggests that the fundamental and undefended goodness of 
Xenophanes’ god is at least as important as any of the features possibly derived from 
argumentation. Burkert marks this as a significant element of Xenophanes’ theology,  
remarking that “for the first time, speaking about the divine is dominated by postulates of 
what is fitting.”76 Heidel adds that his conviction “is not born of knowledge but of 
faith.”77  
The lack of clear argumentation in Xenophanes’ theological fragments leads 
many scholars, as the ones listed above, to doubt the philosophical value of his 
conception of the divine. It is clear, however, that Xenophanes incorporated induction 
and inferential arguments in his work and that authors as early as Plato, Aristotle, and 
Theophrastus saw fit to discuss him among other philosophers, even if they could not 
decipher clear philosophical arguments in his work. Although his poetry did not satisfy 
the rigorous distinctions of Aristotle,  there is no indication that Xenophanes intended to 
present his ideas to an audience expecting a clear and organized system of arguments, 
much less arguments fulfilling the anachronistic standards that apply to Parmenides and 
                                                 
74 Cf. Aristotle’s final remark on Xenophanes and Melissus in this section: οἱ μὲν δύο καὶ πάμπαν ὡς ὄντες 
μικρὸν ἀγροικότεροι (Meta. 986b; fr. A30).
 
75 Jaeger 1947, 49. 
 
76 Burkert 1985, 308. 
 
77 Heidel 1943, 275. 
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 later thinkers; the elegiac fragments B1 and B2 are clearly intended for an audience 
steeped in tradition, and the silloi and other fragments do not incorporate much technical 
vocabulary or abstract thought that would alienate those not specializing in philosophy. 
What then would have convinced Xenophanes’ audience to accept his radical new 
interpretation of the divine? The following chapters will explore the concept of 
Xenophanes’ poetic authority and how he integrates the contemporary inductive 
philosophical methods mentioned in this chapter with a more traditional poetic persona to 
reinvent the role of the poet as an expert on the divine.  
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CHAPTER II: POETIC REINVENTION: GODS, TRUTH, AND AUTHORITY  
    FROM HOMER TO XENOPHANES 
 
By rejecting the anthropomorphic and immoral gods found in epic poetry, 
Xenophanes is questioning the authority of Homer and Hesiod as the primary educators 
of Greece. The epic poets cite the divine Muses as the source for their poetic revelations; 
the Muses teach the bard and give him ἀοιδή (Od. 8.498),78 Hesiod reports a personal 
encounter with the goddesses (Th. 22-35), and both poets invoke them at the beginning of 
their epics and at appropriate times within the poems, such as the introduction to the 
catalogue of ships (Il. 2.484-493). Xenophanes claims to have no such access to the 
world of the divine; instead, he argues that men learn not from divine revelation but 
through inquiry (B18). As we have seen, however, there are limitations to the utility of 
inquiry when one wishes to learn about the gods, inasmuch as the divine exists outside 
the realm of human experience. If Xenophanes does not acquire knowledge through the 
traditional connection between the bards and Muses, and if he cannot offer insight from a 
personal experience in this particular matter, why should his audience subscribe to his 
beliefs concerning the gods?  
 To answer this question, one must first consider the vast difference in social and 
intellectual standards between the world of epic and Xenophanes’ world.  I will therefore 
first explore the nature of the gods, truth, and authority as it is found in the works of the 
epic poets Homer and Hesiod; afterwards, I will consider Xenophanes’ treatment of these 
                                                 
78 For the concept of “song” in Homer as both the capacity to recite poetry and the poem itself, see Walsh 
1984, 9-10.  
 topics in order to examine the extent to which Xenophanes has revised and reimagined 
poetic authority. The epic poets depict a world in which the gods are operative in many 
different facets of life, from meteorological phenomena to psychological and emotional 
impulses such as courage and anger. Their authority is derived not from their ability to 
produce truths that can be independently verified by the listener, but rather from the 
prestige inherent to their social position and from the belief that they possess knowledge 
of remote topics communicated from a divine source. Xenophanes seems to accept the 
role of the poet as an educator and religious advisor, but the source of his authority is not 
based on a connection with the gods; rather his claim to authority relies on judgments and 
inferences drawn from practical experiences and on the traditional elements found in his 
poetic persona: an aged wanderer who has seen many things and can express his thoughts 
on the divine with traditional reverence as well as iconoclastic disdain.  
 The Divine World of Homer 
 The pervasive presence of the divine is a common feature in the epic poems of 
Homer and Hesiod, though the nature of this divine influence develops through the epic 
tradition. The direct involvement of the gods in the world of men is never questioned; 
whether they bring plagues and punishments from afar or meet face to face with a hero to 
advise or rebuke him, their presence is undeniable and inescapable. I will discuss first the 
role of the gods and the function of the bard in the world of Homer before I analyze these 
topics in the poems of Hesiod.  
 The delineation between the world of the gods and the world of men in the 
Homeric poems is often blurred: events on earth can be traced to both human and divine 
sources, and the motivations of one side are affected by the interests of or influences from 
 37
 the other. Human beings do not possess the distinct individuality that characters in later 
literature, such as Greek tragedy or Platonic dialogues, have. “Individuality” does not 
refer here simply to one’s personality, since it is clear that heroes such as Odysseus and 
Achilles display unique personal qualities, but rather to a clearly defined self that is 
distinguishable and “closed off” from the external world.  Modern conceptions of human 
nature typically identify the body and soul as key elements of a human being, yet neither 
of these is found as a fully developed concept in the poems of Homer. There is no term 
that designates the complete and whole human body; as Snell notes, Homer depicts the 
body as “a mere construct” of independent limbs and organs.79 The “soul” (ψυχή) plays 
no part in man’s intellectual capacities or emotions, nor is it presented as the essential 
element of a man’s self while he is alive, as it is in Plato; rather it appears to be an “alien 
self” with an unclear and undefined role within the living body, 80 whose full purpose 
becomes clear once it departs from the body and inhabits Hades as a thoughtless and 
emotionless image of its former body.81 The Homeric figure thinks and feels with the 
organs present in his body: the φρήν, νόος , and θυμός.82
 This aggregate nature of man is open to outside influence, particularly from the 
gods. Consequently the external and internal qualities of men are not consistent or 
independent, but are often affected by divine manipulation. The physical appearance of 
                                                 
79 Snell 1953, 5-7. The term σῶμα, the common term for the whole body in later literature, means “corpse” 
in Homer. 
 
80 Though the ψυχή  is a necessary component of a living being (for when it departs from the body, the man 
is dead), it does not appear to have any bearing on a man’s personality while he is alive.  
 
81 Rohde 1966, 1-8; cf. Od. 11, esp. 139-154, where Odysseus must provide a corporeal element (the blood)  
for the ψυχαί in order to interact with them as intellectually and emotionally capable beings, and not just 
drifting shades. Odysseus’ mother does not recognize him until she has consumed the blood (153).  
 
82 Cf. Snell 1953, 8-15 for a discussion on the complex and overlapping relationship between the latter two 
organs.   
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 Odysseus in the Odyssey frequently changes in accordance with his purposes and designs: 
at some times it is to his benefit to appear ragged and destitute in order convince others 
that he is a lowly beggar; at other times he needs to reveal himself as a glorious hero. 
These changes in appearance are usually marked by the intervention of Athena, who can 
either enhance his form by making him taller and more handsome (8.229-235, 16.172-
176) or mar his attractiveness by causing his skin to wrinkle and his hair to fall out 
(13.429-438).  
 The thoughts and feelings of the Homeric characters are equally susceptible to 
divine influence. The gods are often assigned responsibility for particularly stupid 
behavior; for example, Glaucus engages in an uneven trade with Diomedes because Zeus 
“took away his wits.” (Il. 6.234). Similarly, when characters disagree with the opinions of 
another they occasionally claim that “the gods have destroyed his wits.” (Il. 7.360, 
12.234; Od. 14.178). The gods can also implant courage (θάρσος, Od. 3.76), anger 
(ἄληκτόν τε κακόν τε θυμόν, Il. 9.635-636  ), and “vital energy” (μένος, Il. 5.125 ) 83 into 
human beings. It is often difficult, then, to separate an individual’s own thoughts, 
feelings, and motivations from the interference of the gods; even in cases where a 
particular consideration or motive would seem perfectly natural, Homer often offers a 
divine machination to explain it.84 Human behavior is thus complicated by the pervasive 
presence of divine figures who can manipulate the internal and external properties of 
humans directly and who can influence human behavior through face to face interaction. 
A god, often in disguise, can entice a human character to commit a particular act through 
                                                 
83 Dodds 1951, 8-11. 
 
84 Snell (1953, 30-31) cites Achilles’ restraint, which Homer ascribes to Athena’s intervention, in Il. 1.194-
222, although he was already deliberating his course of action prior to her appearance in 188-193 and could 
have, if the poet so chose, opted not to draw his sword.   
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 persuasive speech; Athena, appearing as Lycaon, convinces Pandarus to launch an arrow 
at Menelaus by appealing to his desire for glory and gifts (κῦδος, ἀγλαὰ δῶρα) and thus 
persuades his foolish mind (τῷ δὲ φρένας ἄφρονι πεῖθεν,  Il. 4.92-104). Voegelin aptly 
summarizes the significance of the divine influence on human behavior:  
For the rest, the transhuman elements of the order of being penetrate so 
deeply into man or, from the other side, man is yet so imperfectly closed 
as a self-conscious, reflecting agent, that the status of various phenomena 
as human or divine must remain in doubt and, in particular, that quite 
frequently it will not be certain to what extent the actions of man are his 
actions at all.85  
 
The susceptibility of men’s thoughts and decisions to divine interference reveals the vast 
extent of the gods’ influence over human behavior. 
 While the gods possess the power to manipulate human thought and appearance, 
their own motivations and concerns are closely tied to mortal characters. Although men 
cannot actively tamper with the gods’ physical, intellectual, or emotional capacities, the 
gods are nonetheless portrayed as serving human causes and interests. Achilles cannot 
manipulate Zeus directly by either interfering with his internal operations or personally 
confronting him; instead, he pleads with his divine mother, who in turn supplicates Zeus 
(Il. 351-527).  Though he knows fulfilling the wishes of Achilles and Thetis will cause 
conflict with Hera, Zeus assents to their wishes and promises to help the Trojans. As 
Hephaestus warns in Il. 1.573-575, quarrels amongst the gods for the sake of humans can 
cause ruin; and yet throughout the Iliad the gods fight with each other, often causing each 
other intense misery, for the sake of mortal interests. Although their powers far exceed 
those of human characters, the gods typically use those powers to help or hurt persons 
and groups within the mortal world. Furthermore, the events in the divine sphere are 
                                                 
85 Voegelin 1957, 103. 
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 revealed and detailed only insofar as they explain events and consequences in the human 
world. As Snell notes, “The human action does not serve a higher, a divine cause, but 
quite the reverse: the story of the gods contains only so much as is needed to make 
happenings on earth intelligible.”86 The narrative subordinates divine events to human 
events, inasmuch as the former almost always provide some explanation for the causes 
and outcomes of human affairs.  
The human and divine worlds are further confused by Homer’s depictions of 
anthropomorphic gods and godlike humans. The gods have bodies comparable to those of 
human beings: they have knees, chins, arms, hands, bellies, and heads with brows and 
hair.87 They furthermore are involved in the same activities and relationships that humans 
are. Zeus and Hera are married, Ares and Aphrodite commit infidelity (Od.8.266-366), 
and the gods sleep (Il.14.352-353) and have feasts (Il.1.601-604). Even when Homer 
attempts to distinguish divine from mortal, the differences are often superficial. The gods, 
despite their immortal status, can be injured; when Diomedes, with the aid of Athena, 
attacks Aphrodite, Homer notes: 
ῥέε δ’ ἄμβροτον αἷμα θεοῖο  
ἰχώρ, οἷός πέρ τε ῥέει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν·  
οὐ γὰρ σῖτον ἔδουσ’, οὐ πίνουσ’ αἴθοπα οἶνον, 
τοὔνεκ’ ἀναίμονές εἰσι καὶ ἀθάνατοι καλέονται. (Il. 5.339-342) 
 
Homer differentiates immortal wounds by observing that the gods do not spill mortal 
blood, but rather divine ἰχώρ. He explains this phenomenon by noting that the gods do not 
eat food or drink wine. It seems natural that divine beings would not need to consume 
anything, inasmuch as they are immortals and should not need sustenance. Yet Homer 
                                                 
86 Snell 1953, 37. 
 
87 Il.1.500-530, 5.330-342, and 5.855-859; cf. Lesher 1992, 91-92. 
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 does not say that the gods do not eat or drink, but rather he depicts them consuming their 
own brand of food and drink, ambrosia and nectar (Od. 5.92-93). Despite their 
immortality and life of ease (ῥεῖα ζώοντες), the gods are still susceptible to injuries and 
possess desire (θυμός) for divine sustenance (Il. 1.602).  
 What then are the fundamental differences between gods and men in Homer’s 
poetry? The gods are immortal (ἀθάνατοι, αἰὲν ἐόντες), more powerful than men (θεοὶ δέ τε 
φέρτεροι ἀνδρῶν, Il. 21.264), capable of accomplishing everything (θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα 
δύνανται, Od. 10.306), and have complete knowledge (θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν, Od. 4.379). 
While the first three qualities are straightforward, Homer’s conception of divine 
omniscience requires some explanation. The gods do not seem to posses an innate 
understanding of everything by virtue of their divine nature, but rather obtain knowledge 
through sense perception, particularly sight. Because of his absence from Olympus (Od. 
1.22-26), Poseidon does not immediately know that the other gods have planned to assist 
the homecoming of Odysseus, but, upon his return from the Ethiopians, he sees Odysseus 
sailing (ἴδεν, εἴσατο) and realizes that the gods have altered their plans during his absence 
(Od. 5.282-290).  The gods nonetheless are often depicted as all-knowing because they 
have the capacity to see all things; the Muses, for example, know all because they are 
constantly present (πάρεστε), while humans, who can neither see as far as the gods nor 
travel as easily, must rely on reports alone (κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν) and therefore do not have 
complete knowledge (Il. 485-486). As Snell observes, the “uncomplicated views which 
he holds concerning knowledge always apply in the same stable ratio: the wider the 
experience, the greater the knowledge.”88 The gods obtain knowledge in the same way 
                                                 
88 Snell 1953, 137. 
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 mortals do, by witnessing things directly, but they have the ability to see and experience 
beyond the limitations of human perception and experience.  
These limitations include temporal as well as spatial boundaries; humans cannot 
observe or know the future, whereas gods such as Proteus (Od. 4.561-569), Circe (Od. 
12.37-141), and Thetis (Il. 1.415-418) have a clearer understanding of what fate and the 
future hold for each hero; even humans who have a close relationship with the gods, such 
as Calchas,89 are described as knowing “the things that are, that will be, and that were 
before” (τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, Il. 1.70). The gods have a knowledge that 
is not bound by temporal limitations and can communicate such knowledge to select 
mortals, like Calchas, who can in turn express these divine revelations to other humans. 
Before discussing humans endowed with access to this divine knowledge, including poets 
as well as seers, I will first discuss the general phenomenon of divine communication 
with mortals in the Homeric poems. 
Divine Communication 
There are several avenues through which the gods can communicate with humans. 
Personal interaction with humans occurs fairly regularly. The gods disclose their divine 
identities to some heroes, such as Odysseus, Menelaus, and Achilles, while for others 
they appear only in disguise; as Odysseus notes, it is difficult even for a knowledgeable 
man to recognize the gods because of their tendency to change shape (Od. 13.312-313). 
The gods also communicate with mortals through dreams. Agamemnon and Penelope 
both experience dreams of divine significance. Zeus deliberately sends a destructive 
dream (οὖλον ὄνειρον) to Agamemnon in order to fulfill the promise he made to Achilles 
                                                 
89 Calchas is not only an expert at reading omens, but also has received his skill from Apollo himself (Il. 
1.68-72). 
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 and Thetis (Il. 2.5-40). While the meaning of Penelope’s dream, that Odysseus will return 
and kill the suitors, is clear to her, she is unaware of the precise source of her dream. She 
notes that it could have come from either the gate of fulfillment or the gate of deception, 
whereas Odysseus recognizes the dream as a true omen presaging the destruction of the 
suitors (Od. 19.535-569). This episode reveals that not all people can recognize signals 
from the gods with equal skill; some people are better able to identify the meanings of 
omens and dreams.90   
When the gods communicate with someone who has experience and skill 
interpreting the world of the divine, such as a seer, the process of communication is more 
complicated than it is in the previous models. Agamemnon’s dream contains a speech 
that makes plain to him the will of the gods, but seers often interpret omens that are not 
so immediately understandable. Theoclymenus observes a bird omen, a hawk grasping a 
dove, and can glean from this portent that the authority of Telemachus’ family is safe 
(Od. 15.525-534).  When Theoclymenus reports this omen to Penelope, he contradicts 
Telemachus’ claim that Odysseus is confined on the island of Calypso; Telemachus has 
no clear knowledge (οὐ σάφα οἶδεν), but the seer can accurately (ἀτρεκέως) prophesy 
Odysseus’ presence in Ithaca through his interpretation of the bird omen (Od. 17.152-
161).91 Seers are capable of understanding more nuanced forms of divine communication 
                                                 
90 Cf. Apollo’s remark to Hermes in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 541-549, where he says that he will help 
some men (those who interpret omens from the right birds) and deceive others (those who look for the 
wrong signs and misuse the art of prophecy). 
 
91 Telemachus’ account of Odysseus trapped on Calypso’s island (Od. 17.142-146) is an accurate 
representation of the information he received from Menelaus’ report of Proteus (Od. 4.556-560). The 
information has, however, become outdated since Menelaus’ encounter with the god, so even though 
Telemachus has a reputable source, he is relying on κλέος  rather than on a more recent and immediate 
signal from the gods.  
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 and can offer a more accurate account of events because of their ability to read omens 
ambiguous to those unskilled in prophecy.  
 The skill and power of the prophets is not limited to discerning perceptible yet 
ambiguous signs; they also have to the power to receive divine messages internally, 
without any explicit outward omen. After Apollo and Athena have decided that Hector 
should challenge one of the Achaeans, they reveal and pursue their plan through the seer 
Helenus:  
τῶν δ’ Ἕλενος Πριάμοιο φίλος παῖς σύνθετο θυμῷ  
βουλήν, ἥ ῥα θεοῖσιν ἐφήνδανε μητιόωσι·  
στῆ δὲ παρ’ Ἕκτορ’ ἰὼν καί μιν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν·  
... 
ὣς γὰρ ἐγὼ ὄπ’ ἄκουσα θεῶν αἰειγενετάων. (Il. 7.44-46, 53) 
 
Helenus understands the gods’ plan in his heart (σύνθετο θυμῷ βουλήν ), but it is unclear 
how their will was expressed to him; the dialogue between Apollo and Athena at an oak 
tree near Pergamos (22-43) seems to have taken place apart from humans, but Helenus 
claims to have heard their voice (ὄπ’ ἄκουσα θεῶν αἰειγενετάων). Leaf and Bayfield point 
out that Helenus “hears” the gods’ counsel “not by the outward ear, but by an inward 
inspiration, as being a soothsayer.”92 Seers then can receive and understand divine 
signals without an obvious outward manifestation.   
  Poetic Truth and Authority  
I have discussed the pervasive presence of gods in Homer’s world, the various types of 
divine communication with mortals, and the existence of figures with skill and 
experience in receiving and interpreting messages from the gods. What then is the 
function of the poet? What relationship does he have with the immortal gods and how do 
they communicate with him? What kind of truth can he offer to his audience and from 
                                                 
92 Leaf and Bayfield 1965 ad 44. 
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 where does he derive his authority? I will argue that poets, like seers, possess a particular 
expertise and a method of receiving divine communication: they can formally express 
knowledge acquired through inspiration from the Muses. The poets can access the 
knowledge of the Muses and deliver an accurate account of events. But the truth of their 
account is not limited to historical veracity; rather it is evaluated by its accordance with 
order (κατὰ κόσμον), which can include a number of qualities, including aesthetic beauty, 
accuracy, and propriety. The poet who can deliver this type of truth is highly respected by 
his audience; the authority of his account is derived both from his special relationship 
with the Muses as well as from a universally recognized social authority based on the 
prestige of his position.  
 The relationship between the poet and Muses is based on two distinct types of 
divine influence: the Muses both teach the poet the skill of reciting poetry and through 
inspiration provide specific content for the bard to sing. Murray notes that though Homer 
himself does not draw a strong distinction between these two modes of influence, 
nonetheless the presence of two types is evident: “The one – poetic inspiration – accounts 
for poetic creativity in terms of a temporary visitation from some external force; the other 
in terms of permanent qualities inherent in the poet.”93 The latter capability, which 
Murray labels “poetic genius,” is evident in the introduction of Demodocus:  
   τῷ γάρ ῥα θεὸς περὶ δῶκεν ἀοιδὴν    
τέρπειν, ὅππῃ θυμὸς ἐποτρύνῃσιν ἀείδειν. (Od. 8.44-45) 
 
The god has given Demodocus ἀοιδή, which here indicates the ability to perform pleasing 
songs as his heart bids him (ὅππῃ θυμὸς ἐποτρύνῃσιν ἀείδειν).94 While this element of the 
                                                 
93 Murray 1981, 89. 
 
94 As Walsh (1984, 10 notes), ἀοιδή can also be used for a specific song, as it is in Od. 8.499. 
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 bard’s relationship with the Muses is significant, it does not seem to differ much from 
other skills conferred on mortals by the gods. For example, Hector notes that the gods 
bestow (ἔδωκε ) a variety of abilities upon humans, including singing (ἀοιδήν), dancing 
(ὀρχηστύν), and military prowess (πολεμήϊα ἔργα, Il.13.730-735). What is the nature of the 
divine influence on the contents of the song?  
 Poetic inspiration from the Muses is mentioned when the poet is requesting 
specific information concerning particular stories, events, or characters; the bard will 
occasionally pause to ask the Muse questions such as who was the first Achaean to win 
bloody spoils (Il.14.508-510) or how fire first fell on the Greek ships ( Il. 16.112-113).95 
The invocation to the Muses at the beginning of the catalogue of ships in Book 2 of the 
Iliad reveals much about the nature of poetic inspiration:  
Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχουσαι·   
ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα,  
ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν·     
οἵ τινες ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν·    
πληθὺν δ’ οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ’ ὀνομήνω, 
οὐδ’ εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ’ εἶεν,  
φωνὴ δ’ ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη,  
εἰ μὴ Ὀλυμπιάδες Μοῦσαι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο  
θυγατέρες μνησαίαθ’ ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον·   
ἀρχοὺς αὖ νηῶν ἐρέω νῆάς τε προπάσας. (Il. 2.484-493) 
 
The Muses are goddesses with complete knowledge (ἴστέ τε πάντα) that is based on 
omnipresence (πάρεστε) whom the poet relies on because he, as a human, hears only 
rumor and knows nothing (κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν). Without access to this divine 
knowledge, the poet claims he would unable to fulfill the vast task of naming all the 
Achaean leaders; even if he had an augmented body and superhuman vocal capacities (μοι 
δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ’ εἶεν) and a stout heart (χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ), those 
                                                 
95 Cf. Pratt 1993, 22-23. 
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 powers would be useless without the proper knowledge and memory (μνησαίαθ’) 
provided by the Muses. Homer’s description of poetic inspiration is, as Murray argues, 
essentially based on the transmission of knowledge and information, with little emphasis 
on the style or structure of the language.96  
The communication of information from Muses to the poet is thus very similar to 
Helenus’ perception of the will of Athena and Apollo; the bard receives messages 
internally (i.e. no outward manifestation is evident to the audience), and he can 
incorporate this information into his poetry. He is not simply a passive mouthpiece of the 
gods, as Plato suggests in Ion 533e3-535a2, but has agency in shaping the words after he 
has received the messages; although his “poetic genius” and skill may ultimately derive 
from a divine source, he may use his poetic gift according to his own discretion. The 
influence of the Muses, including both teaching and inspiration, seems to be a sine qua 
non in the poetic process, rather than its entirety.  The story of Thamyris ( Il. 2.594-600) 
supports this observation. Thamyris boasts that he can defeat the Muses in a singing 
competition and they, in anger, take away his ability to sing (ἀοιδὴν θεσπεσίην ἀφέλοντο) 
and make him forget his former skill in lyre playing (ἐκλέλαθον κιθαριστύν); in doing so, 
the Muses show that they have the power to stop the poetic process (παῦσαν ἀοιδῆς) as 
well as inspire it.  
The poet is able to communicate the information he has received from the Muses 
to his audience, but it is not immediately obvious how these listeners intrepret the content 
of his poem: how do they evaluate the truth-value of a poem and for what reason do they 
accept the bard as an authority on the gods and the distant age of heroes? I will first 
                                                 
96 Murray 1981, 90-92. 
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 examine how Homer presents the relationship between truth and poetry and then I will 
look at his conception of poetic authority.  
Memory is one feature of poetic truth that has received much critical attention; the 
Muses are described as reminding (μνησαίαθ’, Il. 2.492) the bard, or making him forget 
(Il. 2.600), and ἀληθείη, one of the predominant terms for truth in Homer and later 
authors, is etymologically connected with the term for forgetting, λήθη (ἀ - λήθη, “not 
forgetting”). Detienne argues that the concept of poetic truth ultimately depends on 
memory. He claims that the function of memory in poetry is not limited to mnemonic 
techniques of composition and that the combination of Muses and memory “confers on 
the Aletheia of poetry its true, deep meaning.” 97 In this configuration of truth, the poet is 
not offering thoughts and accounts that can be independently verified; the poet sings 
about topics and events far removed from the audience both spatially and temporally. The 
contents of these poems do not evoke the personal memories and experiences of the 
audience but rather, as Detienne notes, the shared cultural stories, practices, and 
institutions that make up the “mythical thought” of Homer’s time.98  By citing the Muses 
as his immediate source, the poet can both preserve these communal memories and 
confer upon them “a religious power that gave poetic pronouncements their status of 
magicoreligious speech.”99 The bard’s truth is thus not subject to the same scrutiny as 
modern scientific propositions are since it is endowed with a divine source and is based 
on the common cultural heritage of his listeners. Poetic truth is simultaneously near and 
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98 Detienne 1996, 29-33. 
 
99 Detienne 1996, 43. 
 49
 remote; while the stories themselves are far removed from the world of the poet and his 
audience, the Muses provide a direct and clear link to the memory of these events.  
Several scholars, however, have criticized attempts to interpret truth and memory 
as equivalent in epic poetry. Adkins notes that Homer uses ἀληθείη in situations where 
memory has little significance. For example, Telemachus remarks that he would rather 
speak the truth (ἐμοὶ φίλ’ ἀληθέα μυθήσασθαι) than burden himself by taking the beggar 
Odysseus with him (Od. 17.12-15);100 truth here refers to honest disclosure rather than 
polite dissembling. Adkins further notes that Homer is fully capable of representing truth 
as an “ordinary-language” concept similar to modern notions: “True statements about 
present events which fall within the experience of the person making them have the same 
relation to ‘the facts’ in any society, literate or non-literate, and are confirmable in the 
same manner.”101 Pratt adds that ἀληθείη and related words are never explicitly used to 
describe the truth-value of poetry or of divine speech. These terms typically indicate the 
truth or falsity of a character’s speech: a true account is one that is “straightforward and 
sincere,” while a false one is either deliberately misleading or factually incorrect.102 The 
poet does not then present the same truth (ἀληθείη) that the ordinary characters in his 
poems are capable of revealing, concealing, and discovering. 
What language then does Homer use to describe the truth-value of poetry? While 
the poet does not use ἀληθείη to describe his own work, he does depict a bard whose 
poems have a definite truth-value. Demodocus sings several tales for the Phaeacians and 
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 Odysseus, including one about a quarrel between Achilles and Odysseus (Od. 8.72-82). 
Odysseus praises Demodocus by saying: 
Δημόδοκ’, ἔξοχα δή σε βροτῶν αἰνίζομ’ ἁπάντων·   
ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ’ ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάϊς, ἢ σέ γ’ Ἀπόλλων·  
λίην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον ἀείδεις,  
ὅσσ’ ἕρξαν τ’ ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ’ ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί, 
ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας. (Od. 8.487-491)                                                         
 
Odysseus is in a unique position to judge the song of Demodocus; unlike the Phaeacians,  
 
he was present at the events detailed in the bard’s song.103 Odysseus praises the poet by  
claiming that he sang “very much according to order” (λίην...κατὰ κόσμον ). In this 
passage “according to order” connotes accuracy; Demodocus sings of the toils of the 
Achaeans “as if he himself were present” (ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ). Poetry and the 
Muses are connected with experiential knowledge: both here and in the Catalogue of 
Ships the notion of presence (πάρεστε, παρεών) is connected with knowledge and 
accuracy.  The overlap in this passage between the actual presence of Odysseus and the 
virtual presence of Demodocus and the Muses is evaluated in terms of order; though 
Odysseus could have called Demodocus’ poem ἀληθής, inasmuch it is in accordance with 
his own experience, he instead expresses the truth of his account by praising its 
accordance with order.                                                                                              
 The phrase κατὰ κόσμον  has a broad semantic range beyond historical accuracy.104 
Unlike ἀληθής, the use of κατὰ κόσμον is not generally limited to speech; the same phrase 
                                                 
103 Hartog (2000, 389-392) discusses this anomaly as one of the key developments in the origin of history, 
namely the “discovery of historicity.” 
 
104 The phrase κατὰ μοῖραν is often closely associated with κατὰ κόσμον. Walsh (1984, 17-19) distinguishes 
the two, arguing that κατὰ κόσμον connotes telling things in the proper order, while κατὰ μοῖραν suggests 
giving each part of the story its due. Pratt (1993, 85) interprets the two as synonymous phrases with ethical 
and aesthetic connotations. While there are some instances where the phrases have identical meanings, as 
when Euryalus’ disrespect for Odysseus is said to be acting neither κατὰ κόσμον (Od. 8.179) nor κατὰ μοῖραν 
(Od. 8.397),  I will concentrate primarily on κατὰ κόσμον because of its prominence in Odysseus’ evaluation 
of the bard Demodocus.  
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 is used to indicate the proper arrangement of arms (Il. 10.472) and orderly reining in of 
horses (Il.11.48), as well as the disorderly (οὐ κατὰ κόσμον) and rash manner in which the 
sons of Atreus summon an assembly at night instead of at daybreak (Od. 3.138). In these 
examples, the phrase “according to order” refers to an established type of behavior that is 
both aesthetically pleasing (the arms are both καλά and arranged εὖ κατὰ κόσμον, Il. 
10.472) and socially beneficial (the disorderly nature of the assembly results in schism, 
Od. 3.149-150). There are also ethical dimensions of κατὰ κόσμον: Zeus threatens the 
other gods with physical abuse, treatment that goes against their dignity (οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, 
Il. 8.12).  
The concern for propriety and respect for the social status of others occasionally 
comes into conflict with the desire to present the truth accurately. Thersites has a 
tendency to quarrel improperly (ἔπεα ἄκοσμα, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον) with kings (Il. 2.213-214). 
The content of his attack against Agamemnon, however, is not essentially different from 
the speech of Achilles;105 instead, his fault is, as Pratt notes, “excessive honesty; (he has) 
said things that were better left unsaid.”106 Odysseus confirms that it is the impropriety of 
this speech that is so reproachable:  
ἴσχεο, μηδ’ ἔθελ’ οἶος ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν· 
οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ σέο φημὶ χερειότερον βροτὸν ἄλλον 
ἔμμεναι, ὅσσοι ἅμ’ Ἀτρεΐδῃς ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον. (Il. 2.246-248) 107
 
Although κατὰ κόσμον can refer to accurate information (Od. 8.489), it can also suggest 
the proper withholding of true information to avoid impropriety.  Adkins creates the 
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107 Although Odysseus does mention that Thersites speaks of things that no one yet knows (252-253), his 
position as worst Greek soldier at Troy indicates that he is in no place to make any comment that violates 
the dignity and status of the kings. 
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 following formulation: if a speech violates the excellence (ἀρετή) of a chieftain or socially 
important character (ἀγαθός), then it cannot be considered κατὰ κόσμον, regardless of its 
truth-value; if the speech does not violate anyone’s ἀρετή , then it is κατὰ κόσμον to tell 
the truth, and the term κατὰ κόσμον can be used to characterize an account as true.108  
The conflict between presenting the truth and maintaining social propriety can be 
explained more clearly by differentiating the particular types of order (κόσμος)  that are 
operative in the recitation of a poem.  Walsh proposes three separate types of κόσμος: the 
order and shape of the poem itself, the congruity of the poem with “the way things are” 
(i.e. accuracy), and the congruity of the poem with social order (i.e. propriety).109 These 
aspects of order do occasionally conflict:  although Thersites’ rebuke is a violation of 
social order, it is not necessarily inaccurate nor is it inelegant (λιγύς περ ἐὼν ἀγορητής, Il. 
2.246). There are, however, many instances where they overlap. For example, Alcinous 
contrasts the “shape” of Odyseus’ words (μορφὴ ἐπέων) and his bard-like skill (ὡς ὅτ’ 
ἀοιδὸς ἐπισταμένως κατέλεξας ) with the behavior of liars and cheats, suggesting that a well 
ordered speech is also likely to be an accurate one (Od. 11.363-369).  Walsh also notes 
the connection between these two types of order: 
If song’s “shape” (morphe) and its order (kosmos) are similar qualities, 
and if verbal “shape” depends on truth, kosmos in the song and kosmos of 
the world should not differ. The song viewed as an articulation of parts 
stands for one viewed as a representation of serially ordered facts.110
 
If the speaker has a reliable and true account that he wishes to present, it is likely that the 
order and shape of his speech will reflect the truth of its contents; the false claims of 
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 dissembling beggars are evident because they do not possess the same shape nor 
demonstrate the same skill as the account of Odysseus. Alcinous’ judgment is not, as a 
modern reader might expect, primarily based on the plausibility of the story’s content: 
Odysseus’ tale is full of fantastic elements, yet its formal qualities as well as his own skill 
add credibility to the account; the stories of liars, however, do not bear the same 
attributes, and Alcinous concludes that they fashion lies “whence one could not see” (ὅθεν 
κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο, Od. 11.366).111 The Homeric Hymn to Hermes contains another instance 
where the structure of a speech reflects its accuracy. Hermes recites the births of the gods 
all in order (πάντ’ ἐνέπων κατὰ κόσμον , 433); while in its immediate context this refers to 
the accurate sequential listing of gods by age (κατὰ πρέσβιν, 431), Apollo reacts to the 
beauty (ἐρατόν, 455) and craft (τέχνη, 447) of the poem.   
 The accuracy of a speech is also closely related to its propriety. Although the 
example of Thersites illustrates how these values can be in conflict, there are also 
situations in which what is inappropriate is also untrue. This is evident in the quarrel 
between Odysseus and Euryalus in Odyssey 8. When the Phaeacian Euryalus taunts 
Odysseus by claiming that he looks more like a merchant than an athlete, Odysseus 
replies that he is speaking out of order (οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, 179). In this case Euryalus is 
speaking inappropriately by insulting a stranger; Odysseus contrasts him, a handsome 
man with little sense, with someone who speaks with gentle respect (αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ, 172) 
and good form (μορφήν, 170). Here the μορφή of the speaker’s words indicates not only 
that it is a genuine and honest speech, but also that the speaker is a modest and respected 
character. Pratt adds that “speech is admired not merely for its formal properties or for its 
                                                 
111 Merry (1961 ad loc.) notes that this phrase can be interpreted two ways: it can either mean “from things 
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so much as see (sc. that they are false)” (ὅθεν = ἐκεῖσε ὅθεν). 
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 truthfulness, but for the way it reveals the good character of the speaker.”112 Euryalus’ 
taunting is brazen and uncouth, but it is also inaccurate: Odysseus easily wins the discus 
throwing contest, and boasts that he can excel in all other competitions except for the 
footrace (187-234). Although Pratt argues that Euryalus is being honest by openly 
admitting what he thinks,113 Euryalus clearly fails to speak either accurately or 
appropriately by insinuating that Odysseus is weak; Odysseus’ ἀρετή is not only a matter 
of social propriety,  but also a real and publicly acknowledged quality that he can 
demonstrate at will.  
The truth of the poet is thus a type of order that often accurately reflects the 
historical truth, but is also inextricably tied to the aesthetic shape and arrangement of the 
poem as well as the standards of social propriety. The poet is in many ways a preserver of 
order: he accurately chronicles historical events and characters,114 his pleasing song often 
calms his listeners and creates a peaceful atmosphere after a quarrel has ended,115 and by 
singing he helps promote the appropriate fame and glory due to gods and men.116 
Through his poem the poet reveals himself to be a figure much like the eloquent and 
modest speaker described by Odysseus (Od. 8.166-179): his graceful, appropriate, and 
accurate speech earns him respect from his audience.   
The authority of the poet seems to depend on the same qualities and standards that 
characterize his poem as κατὰ κόσμον: the ability to compose pleasing, informative, and 
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116 As Penelope notes in Od. 1.338. 
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 appropriate songs. While a successful poem will incorporate all of these elements, 
scholars have debated which quality is ultimately the most important. Detienne suggests a 
fundamental connection between truth (ἀληθείη) and poetry;117 Pratt argues that there is 
more emphasis on the aesthetic qualities of beauty and pleasure than on truth.118 I have 
discussed above the limitations of ἀληθείη in Homer’s work: the term seems to designate 
the “ordinary language” concept of truth119 and is not used anywhere to describe the 
truth-value of poetry. The significance of beauty and pleasure, however, has not yet been 
explored. Pratt argues that Odysseus is a model for the primacy of aesthetic qualities over 
accuracy in the poetic process.120 Odysseus is an expert at crafting lies that resemble the 
truth, such as the story he tells Eumaeus about an encounter he had with Odysseus and 
the hero’s trick that brought him a cloak (Od. 14.462-506). Eumaeus seems to accept this 
story as genuine (οὐδέ τί πω παρὰ μοῖραν ἔπος νηκερδὲς ἔειπες, 509) and is pleased by it. 
Athena, unlike Eumaeus, is able to recognize Odysseus’ lie to her (Od. 13.256-286), but 
she nonetheless is pleased by his cunning (μείδησεν, 287). Pratt concludes from these and 
the other instances of Odysseus’ false tales:  
The Odyssey, with its depiction of Odysseus’ lies, warns us against 
assuming that all credible tales, knowledgeably shaped, are true. It may be 
natural to deduce truth from coherence or credibility, but the Odyssey 
shows itself well aware that the skill of the liar depends on creating this 
same semblance, this same appearance of truth.”121  
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 Poetic accounts are similarly, according to Pratt, to be evaluated primarily by their ability 
to please rather than by their  accuracy.  
There are several qualifications to this view of poetry. First, as Pratt concedes, a 
story can contain truth without necessarily preserving accurately “what actually 
happened.” For example, the story Odysseus tells to Eumaeus reflects Odysseus’ 
character as a generous and cunning man, even if its surface details are fictional.122 
Furthermore, the beauty and pleasure of a poem are not usually qualities distinct from 
and superior to its truth and accuracy. Often the poem pleases and enchants the listener 
by offering wisdom and divine knowledge. The Sirens, for example, enchant (θέλγουσι , 
Od. 12.40) men with their song because it contains extensive knowledge (Od. 12.189-
191), not simply because it is aesthetically pleasing. Similarly, when Odysseus charms 
Alcinous and the Phaeacians (where there is little indication that he is being deceptive), 
the graceful form of his words (μορφὴ ἐπέων, Od. 11.367) is as much an indication of the 
honesty of his account as a product of his skill.123 The poet’s authority and approval are 
not then independent of his ability to present accurate and truthful information; rather, the 
poetic conception of truth is a fundamental part of the κόσμος of the poem.  
 Although the ability to speak κατὰ κόσμον is a token of the bard’s credibility, his 
authority is never doubted and rarely questioned in the poem; there are no disorderly 
bards in Homer’s work with whom Demodocus and Phemius can be contrasted. The poet 
possesses a widely accepted position of honor and respect. While the presence of 
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123 Von Reden 1995, 36 situates the relationship between truth and charm in terms of the guest-host 
relationship: “…while the singer needed the hospitality of a feasting community, he provided the 
knowledge on which society rested. The enchantment caused by his song brought the two interests 
together.”  
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 Odysseus, an eyewitness to the events detailed in Demodocus’ song, affirms the poet’s 
accuracy, there are no skeptics in his audience, nor is there any doubt that he can summon 
the divine knowledge of the Muses. The poet’s position of honor is recognized by the 
other characters in Homer’s work: Demodocus is honored by the Phaeacians (λαοῖσι 
τετιμένον, Od. 8.472) and by Odysseus, who claims that poets obtain honor through their 
relationship with the Muses (Od. 8.479-481); Eumaeus describes bards as welcome 
strangers because of the pleasing songs they offer (Od. 17.385); Telemachus twice 
defends Phemius – once when Penelope protests the choice of song (Od. 1.346-359) and 
later when Phemius begs for his life in front of Odysseus (Od. 22.356-360). It is clear 
from these examples that the whole class of poets, not just Demodocus and Phemius in 
particular, is being honored. Odysseus does not insinuate that Demodocus possesses a 
unique power, but rather he associates him with the class of bards who are loved by the 
Muses (φίλησε δὲ φῦλον ἀοιδῶν, Od. 8.481); Odysseus promises to tell all men that god has 
given Demodocus θέσπις ἀοιδή (Od. 8.497-498), while Eumaeus’ general description of a 
bard is θέσπις ἀοιδός (Od. 17.385). 
The poet’s authority is affirmed by the audience’s reaction while he is singing. 
They listen silently and attentively in a state of enchanted wonder124 at the song (Od. 
1.325-326). The poem marks a period of calm and order, especially after a quarrel.125 
Rarely does anyone interrupt the poet while he is singing; when they do, it is because the 
subject of the song resonates with the personal experience of an audience member, as 
when Phemius sings of the return of the Greek heroes from Troy within Penelope’s 
                                                 
124 Phemius’ songs are called θελκτήρια  in Od. 1.337. Cf. also the Phaeacians’ rapt attention to Odysseus’ 
tale in Od. 11.333-334. 
 
125 e.g. Apollo and Muses in Il. 1.603-604, Demodocus in Od. 8.254-369. 
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 hearing (Od. 1.328-344) or when Demodocus inadvertently relates to Odysseus the story 
of his quarrel with Achilles (Od. 8.72-103). As Walsh observes, the bard’s song typically 
“calls upon nothing in the listener’s own experience or knowledge, and it discourages 
active judgment and interpretation.”126 The audience does not and cannot challenge the 
authority of the poet because the content of his song is beyond their experience and 
beyond the truth-value of ordinary speech. Pratt argues that Athena’s amused recognition 
of Odysseus’ lies (Od. 13.287-295) provides a model for the proper reaction of the 
audience: “a failure to believe it, but amusement and even pleasure at the cleverness of 
the author.”127 The audience, however, is not in the same position as Athena: they cannot 
know whether the content of these songs is accurate, but instead must rely on the 
authority of a divine bard.  
The separation between the content of the poem and the world of the listeners is 
similar to the distance between the poet himself and his audience: bards are presented as 
strangers without attachment to a particular house (Od. 17.385); Demodocus’ poetic 
grace comes at the expense of his sight, so that the wisdom and knowledge found in his 
poetry ultimately stem from this divine source rather than personal experience (Od. 8.63-
64). The special status of the poet and his divine source confer upon his poem an 
authority that is beyond question for his audience. As Detienne argues: 
The poet’s speech never solicits agreement from its listeners or assent 
from a social group, no more than does a king of justice: it is deployed 
with all the majesty of oracular speech. It does not attempt to gather force 
from human approval or disagreement...It is not the manifestation of an 
individual’s will or thought, nor does it constitute the expression of any 
                                                 
126 Walsh 1984, 14. 
 
127 Pratt 1993, 72. 
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 particular agent or individual. It is the attribute and privilege of a social 
function.128
 
The truth and authority of the poet are not questioned or challenged because he, like a 
seer, can access a divine source and present information that is unverifiable to the 
audience. The bard’s song is not, then, evaluated in terms of verifiable truth (ἀληθείη), but 
rather is appreciated because of the aesthetic, ethical, and informational order (κόσμος) it 
contains.  
Divine Deception and Poetic Persona in Hesiod 
 Although Hesiod was writing in the same epic tradition as Homer, his poems 
contain a number of developments in thought and attitude. Since a complete discussion of 
the  differences between these poets is beyond the scope of this paper, I will concentrate 
on two elements of poetic truth and authority found in Hesiod but not present in Homer: 
deceptive Muses and the personalized poet. These two features complicate the Homeric 
concept of the divine bard; while Hesiod makes similar claims to divine inspiration and 
teachings, he also notes that Muses can mislead poets and is more open than Homer to 
personal experience as a source for poetic wisdom.  
 Hesiod does not, like Homer, merely refer obliquely to the divine teachings of the 
Muses. Instead he vividly describes the beginning of his relationship with these 
goddesses as a personal encounter. While he is tending his lambs he is approached by 
them : 
  τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον, 
  Μοῦσαι ᾿Ολυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο· 
 Ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον, 
  ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, 
  ἴδμεν δ’, εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι. 
  ῝Ως ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι· 
                                                 
128 Detienne 1996, 75. 
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   καί μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον 
  δρέψασαι, θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν 
  θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα.  
  καί μ’ ἐκέλονθ’ ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,  
  σφᾶς δ’ αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν. (Th. 24-34) 
 
The dramatic nature of this episode is striking: the careful detail and direct quotation of 
the Muses “dramatize crudely yet forcefully the reality of the Muses as vital, almost 
palpable beings.”129 Hesiod’s world, like Homer’s, includes the undeniable presence of 
the divine in the physical world.130 The Muses initiate Hesiod into the world of poetry by 
breathing divine voice into him (ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδήν), giving him a staff (σκῆπτρον) 
which symbolizes his authority concerning the divine,131 and granting him access to 
divine knowledge not normally available to mortals (τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα). While 
this method of transmitting poetic skill is more vivid than Homer’s description of the 
process,132 the effect is the same for both authors: the poet receives both his skill (poetic 
genius) and his information (poetic inspiration) from the Muses.  
Hesiod’s Muses, however, not only serve as sources of poetic truth, but also 
introduce deception into poetic accounts. Before they confer their gifts upon him, the 
Muses tell Hesiod that are capable of saying true things (ἀληθέα) as well as lies that 
resemble true things (ψεύδεα... ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα). Although there are instances of divine 
                                                 
129 Bradley 1966, 36. 
 
130 Although some have argued that this revelation is either purely a literary convention or a simple 
metaphor for the sudden appearance of an idea, the attention to dramatic detail seems to suggest that this is 
presented as a genuine vision. Cf. West 1966 ad 23-34 for a discussion of these alternate interpretations. 
West also observes that the presence here of typical elements found in other revelatory episodes need not 
discount Hesiod’s sincerity here: “There are fashions in religious experience, and any vision that he had 
would naturally assemble itself in accordance with his subconscious expectations and ambitions.”  
 
131 West (1966 ad loc.) notes that the σκῆπτρον is typically possessed by kings, priests, and prophets as a 
token and symbol of their status as representatives of a god. Hesiod also refers to the poet as an attendant of 
the Muses (Μουσάων θεράπων, Th. 100). 
 
132 Homer’s Muses usually give (διδόναι, Il. 13.730-731,  Od. 8.44) or teach (διδάσκειν, Od. 8.481, 488) song 
to bards.   
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 deception in Homer,133 his Muses, as we have seen, consistently provide the bard divine 
knowledge and the ability to speak κατὰ κόσμον.134 The language of Hesiod’s Muses 
further suggests that their truths and falsehoods are independent of the poem’s aesthetic 
and ethical qualities; their truth is not based on the broad category of κόσμος, but is 
expressed in the straightforward opposition of ἀληθείη and ψεῦδος.135 The falsehoods of 
the Muses are explicitly not true, but they nonetheless appear plausible (ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα). 
The formal qualities of  poetry are not here indicators of its truth because the false 
information from the Muses can be transformed into a beautiful and credible song.   
 The implications of the Muses’ admission are not entirely clear: is Hesiod  
explaining possible discrepencies between his poetry and his rivals’ by suggesting that  
other poets have received false information? Or is he warning his audience not to believe 
everything he says in his own poem? The former option seems more attractive: after  
Hesiod’s encounter with the goddesses, he is able to sing about “what will be and what 
has been before” (Th. 32, 38), much like the seer Calchas (Il. 1.70); furthermore, Hesiod 
claims in the Works and Days that he will say ἐτήτυμα (10). Pratt, however, argues that 
the latter possibility should not be excluded, citing the epithet ἀρτιέπειαι (which has the 
connotation of deceptive speech in Il. 22.281) as evidence of deliberately enigmatic 
speech that “the novice poet must solve to be initiated as a poet.”136 Though this question 
                                                 
133 E.g. The false dream from Zeus which promises to Agamemnon things “not about to be accomplished” 
(Il. 2.36) . 
 
134Odysseus’ deceptive storytelling is described in very similar language (ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν 
ὁμοῖα, Od.19.203). While Pratt (1993, 63-94) argues that Odysseus here is a symbol of poetic fiction and 
deception in Homer, Walsh (1984, 20) seems to be more accurate in arguing that Homer “does not 
explicitly suggest that singers may therefore deceive their audiences, but he has certainly made the 
inference inevitable for the later tradition.”  
 
135 Cf. Adkins 1972, 6-12. 
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 is much debated among contemporary scholars,137 it is clear that in either case the Muses 
are cited as the source of falsehoods in poetry. While Hesiod’s encounter with the Muses 
is presented vividly as a genuine experience, he does not suggest that other poets falsely 
claim divine inspiration; on the contrary, the Muses apparently provide material to all 
poets, but they do not always offer accurate information. The audience thus needs to be 
wary because of the enigmatic nature of divinely inspired song; poets like Hesiod are still 
endowed with religious authority because of their connection with the Muses and the 
social symbols of this privileged relationship (σκῆπτρον), but the truth-value of their songs 
can be complicated by the enigmatic and deceptive nature of the divine signals they 
receive. 
 Despite the Muses’ tendency to provide falsehoods, they play a vital role in the 
order of the world, and the poet is charged with the assignment of interpreting them for 
humans. The poetry of the Muses is extremely pleasing to its listeners (Th. 39-43), but 
they do not exist solely to provide entertainment. The soothing presence of the Muses 
helps princes to resolve public quarrels peacefully and earn the respect of their people 
(Th. 80-97).  The poet, the servant of the Muses, sings about the blessed gods and makes 
men forget about their sorrows (Th. 99-103). Despite its remoteness from the personal 
experience of the audience, the content of Hesiod’s Theogony is extremely relevant to his 
listeners’ understanding of the world. The Theogony describes the development of the 
universe as it moves from chaotic origins to its justly ordered state under the rule of 
Zeus.138 The prevalence of justice is found in both the divine world and the mortal one: 
                                                                                                                                                 
136 Pratt 1993, 110. 
 
137 See Katz and Volk 2000, 122-123 for a recent summary of the two positions. 
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 just as Zeus punishes Prometheus for his deception (Th. 521-525, 613-616), so too Zeus 
punishes humans for their insolence and cruelty (WD 238-247). The poet is thus able to 
relate the order and justice found among the gods to the values of his audience. Bradley 
notes the consequent importance of the poet’s role: “If we were required to single out 
Hesiod’s most distinctive philosophical and poetic purpose, it would have to be his 
preoccupation with rendering intelligible to his fellow men the existence of a just and 
consistent divine will governing all phenomena.”139 The poet’s authority is therefore tied 
to his role as an intermediary between the divine and human worlds; he not only relates 
the knowledge of the Muses and the will of the gods to men through his song but also 
shows how the gods and men exist under the same standards of justice.140  
 Another important feature of Hesiod’s authority is his poetic personality; unlike 
Homer, he chooses to avoid anonymity by naming himself in his poetry (Th. 22). One can 
also glean other personal details from the Theogony and Works and Days:141 Hesiod is a 
shepherd who resides in a poor town near Mount Helicon (Th. 23), to where his father 
emigrated from Cyme in order to escape poverty (WD 633-640). The Works and Days is 
addressed to his brother, Perses, with whom he has had a dispute concerning his father’s 
inheritance (35-41). These biographical details are part of the personal element of poetic 
authority not found in Homer; Hesiod’s advice to his brother includes not only divine 
knowledge communicated to him from the Muses, but also practical wisdom evidently 
                                                                                                                                                 
138 Voegelin 1957, 131-133. 
 
139 Bradley 1966, 41. 
 
140 Cf. Bradley 1966 for an analysis of the Theogony as a reconciliation between gods and men.  
 
141 For the purpose of this paper it is irrelevant whether these personal details accurately describe the 
historical Hesiod or are merely part of a contrived persona; in either case, the speaker of the poem presents 
himself as a distinct personality rather than an anonymous representative of the gods.  
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 derived from personal experience. The Works and Days begins with an invocation to the 
Muses, and many passages in the early part of the work, such as the account of the five 
races of men and the prophecy of the end of the Iron Age (109-201), seem to belong to 
the class of remote knowledge accessible to the bard through divine inspiration.142 As the 
poem continues, however, the content begins to reflect the practical wisdom of an 
experienced farmer rather than the vast knowledge at the Muses’ disposal; much of his 
advice, such as his recommendation for warm clothing in winter (536-546) and his 
opinion on the proper time to plough(448-482), seems obtainable from any industrious 
farmer with experience of the outdoors and the cycle of the seasons.143 The distinction 
between divine inspiration and experiential wisdom can be seen in Hesiod’s remarks on 
sailing. He concedes that he has little skill or training concerning ships (οὔτε τι ναυτιλίης 
σεσοφισμένος οὔτε τι νηῶν, 649), and he observes that his only experience on the sea was a 
trip to Euboea from Aulis (651). He nonetheless feels confident discussing the subject 
because he has access to the knowledge of the gods. He notes: 
  τόσσον τοι νηῶν γε πεπείρημαι πολυγόμφων·  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο· 
 Μοῦσαι γάρ μ’ ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον ἀείδειν. (WD 660-662) 
 
Here Hesiod’s experience (πεπείρημαι) with ships is limited, but he compensates for this 
lack of experiential knowledge by refering to his capacity as a representative of Zeus and 
the Muses; both inspiration and personal experience are valid sources of knowledge, and 
when one falters the other can be substituted without damaging the credibility of the poet.  
 
                                                 
142 These subjects seem to fall into the category of τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα  (Th. 38). 
 
143 Hesiod does, however, consistently insert references to the will of the gods in his practical advice; often, 
though, these comments about the divine amount to little more than admission that the gods are 
unpredictable (ἄλλοτε δ’ ἀλλοῖος Ζηνὸς νόος αἰγιόχοιο / ἀργαλέος δ’ ἄνδρεσσι καταθνητοῖσι νοῆσαι, 483-484). 
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 Xenophanes 
The worlds of Homer and Hesiod are, as we have seen, filled with the pervasive 
presence of the gods; in both authors there is no doubt that the gods exist, are directly 
responsible for many of the occurences on earth, interact and communicate with select 
human beings, and punish or reward humans for their behavior.144 Poets are depicted as 
having a position similar to that of seers that enables them to receive and interpret divine 
messages through inspiration from the Muses and to express that information through 
well-ordered poetic speech. Their authority on divine matters depends on this special 
relationship with the Muses, and the audience within these poems does not seem to 
question it.  
 Xenophanes remarks that the Greek audience, much like the listeners within the 
epic poems, accepts these poets as religious authorities: ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ’ Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ 
μεμαθήκασι πάντες ... (B10). Xenophanes, however, is highly critical of Homer and 
Hesiod’s interpretation of the gods, and he attacks their anthropomorphic and immoral 
depictions of the divine (B11-B12). Yet unlike Homer and Hesiod, Xenophanes does not 
assume a privileged relationship with the gods nor does he claim to have access to divine 
knowledge; in his conception of the world, the gods do not interact or communicate with 
anyone (αἰεὶ δ’ ἐν ταὐτῶι μίμνει κινούμενος οὐδέν, B26; οὔτοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ’ 
ὑπέδειξαν, B18), and the poet no longer has the same privileged position that he has in 
epic. Xenophanes then must offer some other token of credibility in order to gain his 
audience’s acceptance and approval for his novel and provocative ideas. I will argue that 
Xenophanes redefines and reimagines poetic authority by incorporating certain elements 
                                                 
144 In the Iliad the gods seem to decide punishments and rewards based on pre-existing preferences for 
heroes and on acts of loyalty or disloyalty (e.g. Thamyris in Il.2.591-600), whereas in the Odyssey we begin 
to see the beginnings of theodicy (1.32-43). In Hesiod’s work, Zeus is the foremost judge of justice.  
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 from Homer and Hesiod (experiential knowledge and the wisdom of the wanderer) as 
well as inquiry and autopsy based methods that had become popular in Ionia during his 
lifetime. I will begin by comparing Xenophanes’ world to the world of epic, then I will 
discuss Xenophanes’ conception of truth and authority.  
The World of Xenophanes  
Xenophanes presents a world stripped of the divine interaction that was so pervasive in 
the poems of Homer and Hesiod. His one god is involved with events on earth, but this 
involvement is far more removed than the consistent presence of gods among men in the 
epic poems. He assigns two distinct types of influence on the world to the god(s):145 the 
creation of the universe and the source for the movement of all things. While Xenophanes 
never explicitly cites god as the creator of the universe, a number of his fragments 
suggest this conclusion. In B38 he notes that god produced (ἔφυσε) honey, which in turn 
influenced the human conception of sweetness. He raises a similar point in B36: ὁππόσα 
δὴ θνητοῖσι πεφήνασιν εἰσοράασθαι.  The lack of context for the fragment obscures its 
precise meaning, but the use of the term “mortals” (θνητοῖσι) suggests that the gods are 
likely involved.146 The force of πεφήνασιν is key to understanding the potential role of the 
divine in this fragment: the form πέφηνα traditionally represents an intransitive perfect,147 
                                                 
145 Although Xenophanes depicts one god as greatest and most powerful in B23-B26, in other fragments he 
refers to gods both in the singular and in the traditional plural. As I mentioned in ch. 1 (12-16, 19-20), there 
is scholarly disagreement concerning the nature of the “oneness” of Xenophanes’ conception of the divine. 
I agree with Voegelin (1957, 179) that there is no indication that the one greatest god and the traditional 
plural are mutually exclusive. I will refer the gods as plural or singular in accordance with Xenophanes’ 
usage. 
 
146 The adjective appears in two other places in the extant fragments (B18, B23), both of which describe the 
relationship, or rather the lack thereof, between gods and mortals. 
 
147 LSJ s.v. A.III.2 
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 in which case the involvement of the gods in this fragment is not altogether clear;148 
Lesher conjectures that πεφήνασιν may be transitive, and the gods then would be the 
natural subject of the verb of revealing.149 If this is the case B36, like B38, assigns to the 
gods responsibility for creating, or in this case showing,150 what humans can perceive and 
draw inferences from in their world. Divine influence is also a source of movement in the 
universe. Xenophanes notes the greatest god “shakes everything” (πάντα κραδαίνει, B25). 
The image of shaking is, as scholars have noted,151 reminiscent of Homer’s depiction of 
Zeus; Zeus causes Olympus to shake with his nod (μέγαν δ’ ἐλέλιξεν Ὄλυμπον, Il. 530). 
Xenophanes subverts this image by removing the physical gesture from the act: the 
greatest god shakes through an effortless and complex mental process (νόου φρενί, B25; 
οὖλος ὁρᾶι, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ’ ἀκούει, B24) without need for movement (αἰεὶ δ’ ἐν 
ταὐτῶι μίμνει κινούμενος οὐδέν, B26).  
The subversion of Homer’s image reveals the fundamental differences between  
Xenophanes’ conception of the role of the divine in the world and that of the epic poets. 
Homer and Hesiod consistently depict the gods as present and directly involved in affairs 
in the mortal world. Even when the gods accomplish things remotely, as when Zeus nods 
or when Apollo acts as the farshooter (ἑκηβόλος), the action is related through vivid and  
anthropomorphic language: Zeus’s nod causes his hair to fall on his brows (Il. 1.529-
                                                 
148 Guthrie (1971, 397) suggests that there may be a contrast between the things that are evident (πεφήνασιν) 
to mortals and divine matters beyond human experience. 
 
149 Lesher 1992, 176-177. 
 
150 Although the verb φαίνω is used in Homer to describe divine communication through omens (ἔφηνε,Il. 
2.324), Xenophanes has rejected the possibilty of communication between gods and mortals in B18. If 
Lesher’s interpretation of πεφήνασιν is correct, then the perfect tense would suggest their revelation is 
complete (i.e. by creating the world and its visible properties) rather than a continual process.  
 
151 Guthrie 1971, 374; Lesher 1992, 110. 
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 530); Apollo is in motion (κινηθέντος) and walks down from Olympus before he strikes 
the Achaeans from a distance (Il. 1.43-48). The epic gods, despite their immense power, 
are nonetheless limited by the anthropomorphic descriptions of their form and behavior.  
Xenophanes more clearly distinguishes gods from human by suggesting that the god 
accomplishes his will exclusively from afar, and that all divine actions are effortless and 
without any physical movement.  
Xenophanes’ conception of a world free of immediate divine presence is 
consistent with the trend of demythologizing the universe found in contemporary writers. 
Philosophers like Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, as Voegelin notes, “replaced 
the divine figures of myth, in their search of origins, with symbols drawn from objects 
and substances of the world of sense perception.”152 Whereas Homer and Hesiod 
considered the Olympian gods to be the source of natural phenomena, the Ionian thinkers 
often assigned a divine significance to the fundamental principles and elements of the 
universe:153 Anaximander evidently called his ἄπειρον, the originative and fundamental 
essence of his cosmology (ἀρχή), immortal and indestructible (ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ 
ἀνώλεθρον, B3); Anaximenes is said to have believed that air, his ἀρχή, was a god.154 
While Xenophanes also drew inferences from the sensible world as a means of 
formulating the inadequacies of the epic gods, he did not like many Ionian thinkers 
associate the divine with the fundamental natural elements of the universe.  Xenophanes 
did not attribute divine qualities to earth or water, his apparent ἀρχαί (B29, B33). Instead, 
                                                 
152 Voegelin (1957) 167. 
 
153 Cf. Jaeger 1936, 18-37 for a thorough discussion of the Ionian tendency to associate the divine with 
fundamental elements and rational principles. 
 
154 Cicero De Natura Deorum  I.10.26; cf. KRS 1995, 150-151. 
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 he appears to have distinguished the physical universe from the world of the divine.155 In 
fragments B25 and B34 he refers to the universe (πάντα) and the god(s) as separate 
entities, which suggests that earth and water, as Lesher notes, “account for all things 
existing within the natural world, but the nature of the divine is another question.”156 In 
many respects, Xenophanes’ decision to assign such an influential role to a god that is 
distinct from the perceptible universe breaks away from the scientific trend of his Ionian 
predecessors and hearkens back to the pervasive presence of the gods in epic.157 
Xenophanes manages to incorporate both the inquiry-based methods of Ionian philosophy 
and the deeply religious attitudes found in epic poetry; although he is heavily critical of 
Homer and Hesiod, he includes a number of traditional elements into his poetry. I will 
argue that Xenophanes’ conception of truth and poetic authority is a synthesis of 
contemporary philosophical approaches and traditional ideas found in the works of 
Homer and Hesiod.  
 Truth and Opinion in Xenophanes 
The notion of truth in Xenophanes’ poetry is closely associated with sense 
perception; what is true can be seen and experienced by his audience, while falsities are 
incongruous with the perceptible world. The fragments concerning natural philosophy 
(B27-B33, B37) stress the conformity of the world with our perceptions of it: the sun 
travels over the earth and spreads warmth (B31); top of the earth can be seen (ὁρᾶται) 
under our feet, but the bottom, which we cannot see, extends downward indefinitely 
                                                 
155 This interpretation is complicated by the accounts of Aristotle and later writers which claim that 
Xenophanes’ one god was the universe itself. Nevertheless, it is clear that Xenophanes does not assign 
divine significance to earth and water and that these elements properly belong to the category of πάντα 
moved by his god. 
 
156 Lesher 1992, 134. 
 
157 Snell 1960, 141. 
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 (B28); a rainbow is not the goddess Iris but a colorful cloud upon sight (ἰδέσθαι, B32). By 
rooting his natural theories in perception, Xenophanes often rejects more popular and 
traditional theories. While his observation on the sun’s movement is not particularly 
provocative,158 his comments on the extent of earth and the nature of the rainbow 
challenge traditional conceptions. Homer and Hesiod limit the depth of the earth by 
locating Tartarus below it (Il. 8.13-16, Th. 726-728). Xenophanes replaces the mythical 
understanding of the extent of the earth with his own model, which contrasts the defined 
upper boundary (which we can see) with indefinite depths beyond human perception 
(B28). Although Kirk, Raven, and Schofield brand Xenophanes’ formulation as “popular 
rather than intellectual,”159 there is perhaps an intellectual basis behind his conjecture. 
Aristotle alleges that Xenophanes’ postulation is based on a refusal to inquire into the 
cause (ἵνα μὴ πράγματ’ ἔχωσι ζητοῦντες τὴν αἰτίαν, On the Heavens 294a).  Xenophanes, 
however, champions inquiry in other fragments, especially B18 (ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες 
ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον); the indefinite nature of his earth may therefore have more to do 
with the impossibility of inquiry, since no one can see the limits of earth, rather than an 
unwillingness to investigate. His conception of the earth is based on what we can and 
cannot see rather than on mythological or popular ideas. His account of the rainbow in 
B32 is even more polemical, since he explicitly contrasts traditional misconception (ἥν τ’ 
Ἶριν καλέουσι) with reality (νέφος καὶ τοῦτο πέφυκε). Iris is the traditional messenger of the 
gods (e.g. Il. 2.786-787, Th. 780-788), but Xenophanes maintains that a closer look 
                                                 
158 Xenophanes does not here emphatically depersonalize the phenomenon, as he does the rainbow in B32. 
Lesher (1992, 139) notes, however, that Xenophanes may be implicitly contrasting this image of the sun 
with the Homeric god who personally bestows light and heat on earth and who, if angry, can choose to 
deny these gifts (Od. 12.377-383). 
 
159 KRS 1995, 9-10. 
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 reveals that the rainbow is actually a cloud. He rejects the belief in this as a divine avenue 
of communication because he can see (ἰδέσθαι) its true nature. The criterion for truth in 
these examples is utterly removed from aesthetic or proprietary concerns; Xenophanes 
determines the nature of reality through observation and perception.   
These corrections of traditional thought do not, however, incorporate specific 
references to truth. In fact, Xenophanes does not at any point use the term ἀλήθεια to refer 
to his own poetry, nor does he ever make a claim as explicit as Hesiod’s ἐτήτυμα 
μυθησαίμην (WD 10). He does, however, think the limitations of human understanding 
have consequences for the truth-value of his poetry:  
 καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται 
 εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· 
 εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,  
 αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται. (B34) 
 ... 
 ταῦτα δεδοξάσθω μὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι. (B35)160
 
The “clear truth” (τὸ σαφές)161 about the gods and about the universe (περὶ πάντων) is 
beyond human understanding; no man has seen it (ἴδεν), nor will he ever know it (εἰδώς). 
Xenophanes’ conception of truth here is connected with sense perception (ἴδεν) and 
constitutes a clear understanding. The parallel use of the etymologically related ἴδεν and 
εἰδώς emphasizes the connection between experience and knowledge: mortals only know 
the certain truth of things that are within the realm of human experience and that they 
have perceived. As Fränkel concludes, “Xenophanes spoke here, in an ancient and very 
Greek way, of ‘seeing’ in order to designate a truly reliable knowledge.”162 Xenophanes’ 
                                                 
160 I am reading B35 as a continuation of the logic in B34. Cf. Lesher 1992, 171-176. 
 
161 LSJ  s.v. σαφής.  
 
162 Fränkel 1974, 123. 
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 truth depends on a degree of certainty obtained through immediate perception and 
experience; topics such as the gods and the universe, however, are beyond the experience 
of his audience (οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν ) and they cannot understand the truth about them. 
Consequently, in these matters men must rely on opinion (δόκος), which approximates 
truth (ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι ) when the topic is beyond human perception. There are then 
two degrees of truth to Xenophanes’ poetry: the clear truth (τὸ σαφές), which can be 
expressed when the subject matter is within the realm of human experience, and reasoned 
opinions (δόκος) that resemble truth but are uncertain because they are not empirically 
verifiable. I will first examine the significance of the term τὸ σαφές before discussing the 
nature of δόκος. 
The expression τὸ σαφές is not found in epic poetry,163 but Homer uses the adverb 
σάφα to express the certainty of knowledge or the clarity of speech.164 Xenophanes’ use 
of the term is remarkable because by treating it as substantive adjective with the definite 
article and making it the direct object of a verb of sight he extends the applications of 
certainty: it is not only an indicator of the degree of one’s knowledge, it is also an 
independent and observable quality belonging to external objects. The implication of τὸ 
σαφές is that Xenophanes’ conception of truth is an exact understanding of the subject 
matter;  this includes not only the ability to say something that has actually happened (τὰ 
μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών ) but also to have a clear understanding based on 
personal experience (οἶδε). The accuracy of the content is an independent quality of the 
work that is privileged above the aesthetic value of the poem and the audience’s concern 
                                                 
163 Although the phrase σαφὲς δ᾽ οὐκ οἶδα appears in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 208, the internal 
accusative σαφές does not appear to differ greatly in meaning from σάφα.  
 
164 Cf. Cunliffe 1963 s.v. σάφα.
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 for social propriety. Thucydides uses the term in a very similar way: he warns his 
audience that his account may not be as pleasing as the fanciful tales told by others (ἐς μὲν 
ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται), but it will benefit all those who 
wish to examine the clear truth (τὸ σαφές) of the things that have happened and will 
happen (1.22.4). Truth as historical accuracy is contrasted with the pleasing qualities of 
exaggerated and unrealistic stories; it must be examined (σκοπεῖν) in order to be 
understood, just as Xenophanes’ truth depends on knowledge based on immediate 
perception (ἴδεν, εἰδώς, B34).165
Xenophanes, like Thucydides, rejects the mythical explanations of his 
predecessors (B11-B12) and defines the truth of his account through empirical language. 
Xenophanes’ insistence on inquiry and experience as a gauge of truth is not unique. As 
Thomas notes, other roughly contemporary forms of literature were asserting their 
authority through the “language of proof and evidence.”166 Medical writers inferred 
truths from τεκμήρια, such as in Airs, Waters, Places 8, where the writer claims one can 
glean the greatest evidence (τεκμήριον μέγιστον) about the formation of rain water from a 
man wearing a cloak who sits in the sun.167 The orator Antiphon often draws inferences 
from τεκμήρια, as when he calls the defendants’ unwillingness to supply their slaves for 
torture the greatest evidence (μέγιστα τεκμήρια) of their guilt in Against the Stepmother 
11. Historians such as Hecataeus and Herodotus published historical works based on 
inquiry (ἱστορίη) and including inferences drawn from autoptic experience; Heraclitus 
                                                 
165 Thucydides’ examination of history incorporates his own personal observations (οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν) as 
well as the observations of others, although he concedes that eyewitness testimony is often unreliable 
(1.22.2-3). 
 
166 Thomas 2000, 128-130. 
 
167 Thomas 2000, 140. 
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 joined Xenophanes with Hecataeus in his criticism of polymathy, which suggests that 
both thinkers were recognized as proponents of “Milesian ἱστορίη in literary form.”168  
The process of observation and inference from physical evidence was also an 
important trend in the development of philosophy. Although the early Milesian 
philosophers proposed novel cosmological theories to replace mythological conceptions 
of the world, there are unfortunately few explicit references to inquiry or evidence in the 
extant fragments169 and several of their theories seem dogmatic.170 Nevertheless, there 
are several pieces of testimonia that suggest that even these earliest philosophers were 
engaged in empirical and inferential enterprises: Thales’ prediction of the eclipse was 
most likely based on a “long series of empirical observations,”171 even if he himself was 
unaware of the cause; Anaximander’s accounts of the origins of living creatures and 
mankind may have developed from his observations of mud-flies and other creatures 
living near or in the sea.172 Xenophanes, like his philosophical predecessors, does not 
frequently use the language of proof, but it is clear from the emphasis on experience and 
perception in his theories on nature (B28, B31, B32) and human knowledge (B34), as 
well as from his endorsement of seeking (ζητοῦντες) in B18, that observation and 
inference are essential components of the truth found in his poetry. Unlike these thinkers, 
however, Xenophanes incorporates these values into a poetic model by expressing his 
                                                 
168 Kahn 1979, 108. 
 
169 Thomas 2000, 139. 
 
170 KRS 1995, 175 mentions that Xenophanes’ comment on the limits of the earth (B28) may have been an 
attack against the unsupported propositions by Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. 
 
171 KRS 1995, 82. They add, however, that these observations were probably derived from other sources, 
namely from Babylonian records, rather than from Thales’ own experience. 
 
172 KRS 1995, 142. 
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 thoughts in verse and explicitly contrasting his conception of truth with that of the epic 
poets. 
Although Xenophanes use of τὸ σαφές as an indicator of poetic truth is novel, the 
contrast between clear knowledge and supposition is a familiar one in epic poetry. One 
reason that epic characters have uncertain knowledge is that particular  matters are 
beyond their personal experience: Odysseus rebukes Thersites for commenting on the 
future, which is beyond human understanding (οὐδέ τί πω σάφα ἴδμεν ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα, 
Il. 2.252); the old shepherd in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 202-211 does not know for 
sure (σαφὲς δ᾽ οὐκ οἶδα) whether the child Hermes stole Apollo’s cattle because he does 
not trust his perception (ἀργαλέον μὲν ὅσ’ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἴδοιτο) and must make a conjecture 
(ἔδοξα...νοῆσαι). Occasionally the incomplete knowledge of one character is contrasted 
with the accurate understanding of another: in Odyssey 17.153-154 Theoclymenus 
criticizes Telemachus’ uncertain knowledge (οὐ σάφα οἶδεν) with his own ability to 
prophesy exactly (ἀτρεκέως γάρ τοι μαντεύσομαι). In this example, Theoclymenus 
possesses a particular skill and expertise concerning the divine – the ability to read omens 
– that Telemachus does not. Seers can access divine knowledge and thus know clearly 
matters which other mortals cannot, much as a poet can transmit the absolute experiential 
knowledge of the Muses (πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα), while others must rely on report 
(κλέος, Il. 2.484-493). Xenophanes uses the Homeric distinction between certain and 
uncertain knowledge, but adapts it by removing the possibility of divine communication 
with humans. Clear and certain understanding is associated with sense perception in both 
authors, as is the recognition of limitations of human experience and knowledge. While 
Homer and Hesiod can transcend these mortal boundaries by summoning the Muses 
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 through divine inspiration, Xenophanes argues that the gods have never communicated 
everything to mortals (οὔτοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ’ ὑπέδειξαν, B18) and that since 
the clear and certain truth is only attainable through experience and inquiry, men will 
never understand τὸ σαφές about the nature of gods and the universe.   
Although men cannot gain certain knowledge about subjects beyond their 
experience, Xenophanes proposes an alternative standard for gauging his work. He 
exhorts his audience to suppose that his theories on the gods and the universe are 
approximations of the truth (ταῦτα δεδοξάσθω μὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι). Like all mortals, 
he must rely on opinion in matters that he cannot personally observe (δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι 
τέτυκται). Not all opinions, however, are considered equal. Men suppose (δοκέουσι) that 
gods are born and possess human physical traits (B14), opinions that Xenophanes finds 
clearly erroneous. Why then are Xenophanes’ opinions to be trusted more than those of 
others? Although he never says so explicitly, he seems to privilege his own ideas about 
the gods because he removes the observable contradictions and inconsistencies found in 
popular religion and epic poetry. The desire to represent the gods as analogous in form 
and behavior to the believer leads to incongruous depictions of universal gods (B15-B16) 
and stories of honored deities engaged in dishonorable behavior (B11-B12). Xenophanes’ 
conjectures, while not certain truth, are closer to it because they are free of the problems 
found in the opinions of others.  
Xenophanes uses epic models also in this formulation of the values of opinions. 
His claim that his theories are to be considered as resembling truth (ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι) 
clearly resembles passages found in Homer and Hesiod. Homer describes Odysseus’ 
deceptive storytelling as ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα (Od.19.203), while Hesiod’s 
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 Muses inform him ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα (Th. 27). In both cases, the 
plausibility of lies and deception (ψεύδεα) is expressed through their resemblence to the 
truth (ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα). In neither passage is the likeness to truth particularly beneficial to 
the listener: Penelope longs to hear the truth about her husband, but Odysseus, in order to 
fulfill his purpose, uses lies that cause Penelope to cry in mourning (Od. 19.204-209); 
Hesiod claims to tell the truth (ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην, WD 10), but, inasmuch as his truth 
differs from the truths of other poets, he assigns responsibility to deceptive Muses. 
Xenophanes subverts this model by contrasting the truth with opinions rather than with 
lies. The clear truth (τὸ σαφές) is, of course, preferable to opinion, just as truth is 
preferable to lies for the listeners in epic. The decision to promote theories resembling 
truth, however, is not based on a desire to conceal the truth but rather an inability to 
understand it fully. The essentially negative qualities of lies (ψεύδεα) in epic poetry 
become potentially beneficial in the process of explaining topics beyond human 
experience. 
Xenophanes’ conception of truth incorporates the contemporary intellectual trend 
of inquiry and inference, but he expresses his findings through the language and models 
of his epic predecessors. Xenophanes opted to write in meter, though previous Presocratic 
thinkers like Anaximander and Anaximenes wrote in prose. Although prose writing was 
fairly undeveloped and poetry was still the predominant form of expression, Xenophanes 
does not show any signs that he wishes to escape the poetic medium. He incorporates 
elegaic, iambic, and epic meters; 49 of his 119 extant lines are in dactylic hexameter and 
it is in these that he presents his criticisms of Hesiod and Homer (B10-B12), his 
propositions on the nature of the one god (B23-B26), and his comments on the limitations 
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 of human knowledge (B18, B34-B35). In addition to using the epic meter, Xenophanes 
also uses terms and phrases common in epic poetry. Torres-Guerra notes eighteen 
formulaic expressions from epic found in the Xenophanean corpus, as well as eight 
unique phrases in Homer that are incorporated by Xenophanes.173 Furthermore, 
Xenophanes’ reference to the genre of Greek poetry (ἀοιδάων ἦι γένος Ἑλλαδικῶν, B6) 
suggests that he “visualizes Greek poetry as a kind of single family of songs, even as 
Homer and Hesiod viewed the minstrels themselves as members of the same tribe or 
family.”174 Though Xenophanes rejects the epic configurations of the divine, he 
nonetheless presents himself and his theories as part of the poetic tradition. Consequently, 
his authority is based not only on his ability to provide truths derived from sense 
experience and inference, but, as I shall argue, also on established poetic models such as 
the appeal to ethical values and the traditional poetic persona.   
 Traditional and Intellectual Authority 
The concept of the divine as the source of justice develops throughout epic poetry. 
Zeus disavows divine responsibility for mortal crimes in the beginning of the Odyssey 
(1.32-43), and Hesiod consistently associates Zeus with the standards of justice.175 
Xenophanes, much like Hesiod, aligns his conception of the divine with justice and other 
moral values. In B1 he depicts a symposium in which he couches innovative ideas in a 
traditional setting:  
  νῦν γὰρ δὴ ζάπεδον καθαρὸν καὶ χεῖρες ἁπάντων  
       καὶ κύλικες· πλεκτοὺς δ’ ἀμφιτιθεῖ στεφάνους,  
    ἄλλος δ’ εὐῶδες μύρον ἐν φιάληι παρατείνει· 
       κρατὴρ δ’ ἕστηκεν μεστὸς ἐυφροσύνης,  
                                                 
173 Torres-Guerra 1999 passim. 
 
174 Havelock 1966, 52. 
 
175 Cf. Voegelin 1957, 131-133. 
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     ἄλλος δ’ οἶνος ἕτοιμος, ὃς οὔποτέ φησι προδώσειν, (5) 
       μείλιχος ἐν κεράμοισ’ ἄνθεος ὀζόμενος·  
   ἐν δὲ μέσοισ’ ἁγνὴν ὀδμὴν λιβανωτὸς ἵησι· 
       ψυχρὸν δ’ ἔστιν ὕδωρ καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ καθαρόν· 
      πάρκεινται δ’ ἄρτοι ξανθοὶ γεραρή τε τράπεζα   
       τυροῦ καὶ μέλιτος πίονος ἀχθομένη· (10) 
      βωμὸς δ’ ἄνθεσιν ἀν τὸ μέσον πάντηι πεπύκασται, 
       μολπὴ δ’ ἀμφὶς ἔχει δώματα καὶ θαλίη.  
      χρὴ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑμνεῖν εὔφρονας ἄνδρας  
       εὐφήμοις μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις·   
      σπείσαντας δὲ καὶ εὐξαμένους τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι (15) 
       πρήσσειν—ταῦτα γὰρ ὦν ἐστι προχειρότερον— 
      οὐχ ὕβρις πίνειν ὁπόσον κεν ἔχων ἀφίκοιο  
       οἴκαδ’ ἄνευ προπόλου μὴ πάνυ γηραλέος. 
      ἀνδρῶν δ’ αἰνεῖν τοῦτον ὃς ἐσθλὰ πιὼν ἀναφαίνει,   
       ὥς οἱ μνημοσύνη καὶ τόνος ἀμφ’ ἀρετῆς, (20) 
      οὔτι μάχας διέπων Τιτήνων οὐδὲ Γιγάντων 
       οὐδέ <τε> Κενταύρων, πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων, 
      ἢ στάσιας σφεδανάς, τοῖσ’ οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἔνεστι· 
       θεῶν <δὲ> προμηθείην αἰὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν.  
 
There are many conventional elements in this description: the external setting is both 
clean and pure (καθαρόν) and the proper procedure is followed: libation (σπείσαντας, 15), 
prayer (εὐξαμένους,15), paean (ὑμνεῖν, 13),  and finally drinking (πίνειν, 17) and 
entertainment, in this case proper storytelling (ἐσθλὰ πιὼν ἀναφαίνει, 19).176 The poet 
creates an analogy between the propriety of these settings and procedures and the 
propriety of what is said: just as the floor and water must be pure (καθαρόν), so must be 
the words uttered (καθαροῖσι λόγοις, 14). The suggested content of the prayers and songs 
contains both traditional and innovative elements. Xenophanes’ recommended prayer is 
for the ability to accomplish what is just (εὐξαμένους τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι / πρήσσειν, 15-16). 
In this prayer he, like Hesiod, is attributing to the gods the role of dispensers of justice.  
Unlike Hesiod, however, Xenophanes is not suggesting that the gods personally avenge 
and reward just behavior; rather he insinuates that the gods promote justice by granting 
humans the power (δύνασθαι) to carry out justice for themselves. The nature of this divine 
                                                 
176 Marcovich 1978, 7-11. 
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 assistance is not immediately apparent; one could argue, for example, that the gods 
promote our ability to act justly by granting us prosperity, inasmuch as it is much easier 
to be just individuals when our basic needs are met.177 Marcovich argues that ability 
indicates “intellectual capacity to choose the right thing to do,”178 which is an 
interpretation that is consistent with the intellectual nature of Xenophanes’ one god in 
B23-B26 and the emphasis on mental activities within this poem (μνημοσύνη, 20; 
προμηθείην, 24), though the term δύνασθαι does not by itself suggest mental or intellectual 
capacities. At any rate, it is evident that Xenophanes is drawing on the traditional ethical 
association of justice with the gods but has reformulated it to fit with his more refined 
and intellectual conception of the divine.  
The content of drinking songs (19-23) further illustrates the balance between 
tradition and innovation in this poem. Xenophanes recommends that men sing of noble 
acts (ἐσθλά) while incorporating memory (μνημοσύνη) and virtue (ἀρετῆς) into their songs. 
This appeal to traditional values might also call to mind the glorious deeds of battle found 
in epic poetry, but Xenophanes makes it clear that he is rejecting accounts of the mythical 
battles and conflicts (μάχας, στάσιας) of Centaurs, Titans, and Giants. These stories are 
denounced as useless (οὐδὲν χρηστόν) and as fictions of his predecessors (πλάσματα τῶν 
προτέρων). Although Xenophanes rejects the teachings of former poets, he nonetheless 
maintains an essentially ethical portrayal of the gods; by couching his innovative ideas 
within the traditional sympotic setting and conventional values, he affirms the ethical and 
proprietary principles that are an essential part of poetic authority.   
                                                 
177 E.g. Cephalus’ remarks on wealth and justice in Republic 330d-331b. 
 
178 Marcovich 1978, 8. 
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  The ethical component of Xenophanes’ view of the divine is also found in his 
attacks against Homer and Hesiod, as well as in his positive comments on the nature of 
god. The gods in epic poetry are guilty of moral offenses (ἀθεμίστια ἔργα, B12): they 
steal, commit adultery, and deceive each other (B11). This criticism operates on two 
levels: on the one hand, the gods’ anthropomorphic behavior suggests that the poets are 
basing their representations of the gods on observations of human activities rather than on 
divine sources; on the other hand, the specifically unethical nature of the gods’ actions 
immediately suggests to Xenophanes’ audience the inconsistency of the development 
towards a divine affiliation with justice found in epic poetry. Although Hesiod repeatedly 
assigns Zeus the position of arbiter of justice, he also attributes immoral behavior to him, 
such his deception and consumption of Metis (Th. 886-900). Xenophanes’ rejection of the 
epic conception of the divine incorporates then both an ethical and a logical appeal, 
which demonstrates his desire to include both contemporary models of philosophical 
thought and a refined version of the traditional ethical values found in the poetic 
tradition.  Similarly, in his comments on the stationary nature of his one god, he argues 
that it is not seemly (ἐπιπρέπει) for the god to travel. The term ἐπιπρέπει has both empirical 
and moral connotations: the term is related to appearance179 and it can indicate 
empirically what an object appears to do, descriptively what actions are characteristic of 
it, and prescriptively what actions are appropriate and fitting for it.180 Xenophanes’ 
description of his god here can be read in two ways: empirically, one can see no trace of 
divine movement in the universe; ethically, the concept of divine locomotion does not fit 
                                                 
179 In Homer the term ἐπιπρέπω is exclusively used to describe physical appearance (Od. 24.252), though 
πρέπω and its other compounds often denote other types of distinction such as ones reputation, as Cunliffe 
(1963 s.v. πρέπω and μεταπρέπω) notes. 
 
180 Lesher 1992, 111-112. 
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 the exalted status of the gods found in other fragments such as B1.181 The concern for the 
proper dignity and moral excellence of the gods is a significant element in Xenophanes’ 
representation of the divine. This ethical concern adds traditional poetic authority to his 
more scientific concern with inquiry and inference.  
 Another traditional element of Xenophanes’ authority is his development of a 
poetic persona. While Homer remains anonymous in his poems, Hesiod presents himself 
as a distinct character with an authority derived from both his special relationship with 
the Muses and his extensive personal experience with agricultural and other everyday 
skills. Xenophanes does not, as Hesiod does, name himself in his poetry or describe his 
familial relationships. He does, however, offer several key details about himself: he is 
extremely old (at least 76 years of age, according to B8), he has traveled a great deal (ἐγὼ 
δὲ ἐμαυτὸν πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως φέρων ἐβλήστριζον, B45), and his wandering is related to his 
resentment of the pervasive Eastern influence on his home in Ionia (B3, B22). This 
persona is consistent with the representation of poets found in Homer and Hesiod. Like 
Eumaeus’ assessment of bards in Odyssey 17.385, he is an outsider and perpetual ξεῖνος: 
he wanders throughout Greece (B8, B45) and has a keen interest in preserving the proper 
etiquette in the guest-host relationship (B22).182 Unlike the poets in Homer, though, 
Xenophanes is well versed in the world around him; he is essentially the antithesis of 
Demodocus, in that his conception of poetic truth is fundamentally dependent on vision 
rather than on divine communication. The notion that traveling can be a source of 
knowledge is also found in Homer. Odysseus in his travels sees many towns and comes 
                                                 
181 Lesher 1992, 112; Burkert 1985, 308. 
 
182 Xenophanes seems to follow Homer’s precedent in recommending that the host feed the guest before 
asking him questions (Od. 3.69-70).  
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 to understand the minds of many men (πολλῶν δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω, Od. 
1.3), and later, while in disguise, he claims to Eumaeus that his travels (ἐπὶ πολλὰ δ’ 
ἀλήθην) grant him the ability to give tidings about Odysseus (Od. 14.120).183 
Xenophanes’ persona incorporates both the traditional image of the wandering poet and 
the particular type of empirical knowledge that was alien to the Homeric bard but 
accessible to other characters. Xenophanes’ old age and many travels prove to be 
valuable sources of experiential knowledge. By contrasting  Thracian and Ethiopian 
depictions of the gods (B15) he provides a vivid comment on general human practice; his 
juxtaposition of cultures at the northern and southern extremities calls to mind his 
extensive travelling and implies the universal nature of his inference .    
 One final element of Xenophanes’ authority is his insistence on the beneficial 
nature and utility of his poetry. In B2 he chastises the city for placing so much honor on 
athletes when his wisdom (ἡμετέρη σοφίη) is better (ἀμείνων) than their strength (11-12). 
The term σοφίη is found twice in this poem and nowhere else in the extant fragments. Its 
nature here is not immediately apparent: is he referring to a particular type of wisdom or 
art that he possesses or does he mean the broad range of wisdom found generally in his 
poetry? Furthermore, does σοφίη refer to poetic art,184 wisdom,185 or some combination of 
the two? Although these questions are difficult to answer conclusively, it seems best to 
regard σοφίη as a more general quality that covers Xenophanes’ intellectual conception of 
poetry, inasmuch as in other fragments he refers to his work generally as his own thought 
(ἐνιαυτοὶ / βληστρίζοντες ἐμὴν φροντίδ’ ἀν’ Ἑλλάδα γῆν, B8). At any rate Xenophanes argues 
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 that his σοφίη possesses a practical value: it keeps the city in good order (ἐν εὐνομίῃ, 19) 
and it makes the city richer (πιαίνει...μυχοὺς πόλεως, 22). The utility of his poetry is 
moreover associated with ethical values; not only is it impractical to honor athletes’ 
strength over his wisdom, it is also unjust (οὐδὲ δίκαιον, 13). The things which promote 
good order (εὐνομίη) are thus both practically beneficial and morally right, whereas acts of 
disorder,186 which include violent and lawless behavior, are in other fragments 
condemned as useless (τοῖσ’ οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἔνεστι, B1.23 ) as well as immoral (B11). 
Xenophanes here is again adapting traditional poetic values and inserting his own 
innovative thoughts and interests. He wishes to retain and restore the universal honor paid 
to poets found in the works of Homer, but he bases this honor not on an ability to deliver 
pleasing accounts of mythical events but on his intellectual virtues that promote practical 
and ethical benefits. The poet contributes to order, but Xenophanes’ order (εὐνομίη) is 
founded on contemporary government (πόλις) rather than the κόσμος and ἀρετή of Homer’s 
aristocratic values.   
 Xenophanes’ interest in the medium of poetry is not superficial. He manages to 
adapt traditional poetic language and values to fit his provocative conceptions of the 
gods, truth, and authority. But to what extent are his notions of truth and authority 
unique? We have seen the influence of traditional epic models and contemporary 
intellectual trends on Xenophanes’ work, but how influential were these on other 
contemporary poets and to what degree does Xenophanes’ work fall into the general 
poetic patterns emerging in the 6th and 5th centuries?  In my concluding chapter, I will 
                                                 
186 As Marcovich (1978, 20-21) notes, Xenophanes is not accusing athletes of causing ὕβρις or disorder, as 
others have claimed, but rather suggests that they do not positively contribute to the ordering of the city. 
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 discuss the poets Parmenides and Pindar and compare their conceptions of gods, truth, 
and authority with those of Xenophanes.
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CHAPTER III: CONTEMPORARY MODELS: THE POETRY  
  OF PARMENIDES AND PINDAR 
 
Xenophanes’ conceptions of truth and authority privilege empirical knowledge 
and human investigative enterprise over claims to divine inspiration and communication, 
but he also manages to frame these modern ideas within traditional poetic values and 
assumptions. In the previous chapter I mentioned the intellectual trends found in medical, 
historical, rhetorical, and philosophical writers contemporary with Xenophanes. I now 
wish to examine his poetic peers: to what degree is his representation of truth and 
authority unique? How radical is his attempt to redefine his audience’s understanding of 
the world and the gods? Although Xenophanes’ poetry shares a number of important 
features with many poems in the lyric and elegiac genres,187 I will concentrate on two 
contemporary poets, Parmenides and Pindar, whose conceptions of the gods, truth, and 
authority will serve as fruitful comparisons for those of Xenophanes. Parmenides, the 
alleged pupil of Xenophanes, expresses his innovative theories on the nature of Being 
within a hexameter poem full of traditional poetic devices and motifs. Pindar composes 
epinician odes that relate recent athletic victories and political events to mythical stories 
and comments on the world of the gods. While these two poets offer very different 
perspectives on the gods, truth, and authority, they both rely on claims to a special 
relationship with the divine. Xenophanes, like them, incorporates traditional poetic values 
into his work, but his criteria for truth include firm adherence to autopsy as well as a 
                                                 
187 These include the general focus on the individual (Snell 1960, 43-70), the rejection of certain mythical 
accounts found in epic poetry (e.g. Stesichorus’ revision of the Helen story, 192 Campbell), and the 
attention to decorum in sympotic settings (e.g. Anacreon 11a-b).  
 complete reliance on human investigation, neither of which is found in the same degree 
in the works of Parmenides or Pindar. 
Parmenides  
  
 The extant fragments of Parmenides seem to belong to a single hexameter poem 
that details his visit to an unnamed goddess and her report to him. The goddess’ speech, 
which comprises all but the first fragment, is divided into two sections: the first part of 
her account (B2-B8.49) concerns the way of truth (ἀληθὴς ὁδός, B.8.17-18), that Being (τὸ 
ἐόν) exists and is ungenerated, undying, unchangeable, and complete; the second part 
(B8.50-B19) details the opinions of mortals (βροτῶν δόξας, B1.30) and includes 
cosmological speculations and descriptions of natural phenomena. Parmenides’ 
distinction between ἀληθείη and δόξα is in some ways similar to Xenophanes’ formulation 
of τὸ σαφές and δόκος: both authors offer specific criteria for determining truth as well as 
conjectures that do not meet these criteria. Parmenides’ account, however, indicates that 
the truth about the universe is attainable for particular individuals, whereas Xenophanes 
must resort to supposition in his treatment of the gods and the universe, inasmuch as 
these matters cannot be personally observed and experienced. I will first discuss 
Parmenides’ conception of truth before I discuss his use of traditional and innovative 
elements in establishing his authority.      
 Parmenides uses the term ἀληθείη to designate the positive truth-value of the 
goddess’ account and, by extension, his own poetry. The words ἀληθείη and ἀληθής are 
found seven times in the first part of the goddess’ report; the only other term in his work 
that has a definite truth-value, ἐτήτυμος, is found just once (B8.18). The truth of his 
account of Being is in opposition both to the impossibility of Not-Being (B2) and to 
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 mortal opinions (B1.30). While the dichotomy between Being and Not-Being represents 
the fundamental distinction (ἡ κρίσις) in Parmenides’ argument (B8.15-16), he introduces 
his conception of truth by opposing it to human conjecture. In his proem, Parmenides 
does not contrast ἀληθείη with ψεῦδος, as Hesiod does (Th. 26-28), but with the opinions of 
mortals:  
   χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ 
   ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. (B1.28-30) 
 
This introduction to the two ways of inquiry provides some insight into Parmenides’ 
conception of truth. The truth is well-rounded (εὐκυκλέος), has an unmoved heart (ἀτρεμὲς 
ἦτορ), and lends to an account credibility (πίστις) not found in mortal opinions. The terms 
εὐκυκλέος and ἀτρεμές have caused confusion among scholars. The words seem to be 
refering to motionless and sphere-like properties of Being described in B8, but the 
equation of Being with truth itself has not satisfied all.188 Some have adopted Sextus’ 
reading, εὐπειθέος (Adv. Math. 7.111), over Simplicius’εὐκυκλέος (De Caelo 557);189 
Fränkel suggests ἀτρεκές to replace ἀτρεμές.190 While the latter emendation has not found 
many supporters, the former seems to fit plausibly with the connection between truth and 
persuasion found in this fragment (πίστις ἀληθής) and in others: in B2 he notes that the 
path of persuasion (Πειθοῦς κέλευθος) is attended by truth, and he ends the first part of his 
work by referring to it as πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα / ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης (8.50-51). Furthermore 
the term εὐκυκλής appears only here, whereas the adjective εὔκυκλος is found in other texts 
                                                 
188 Jameson 1958, 22-23. 
 
189 E.g. Jameson 1958 passim; Mourelatos 1970, 154-157. 
 
190 Fränkel 1975, 352 n. 11.  
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 as well as in Parmenides’ poem (B8.43).191 The choice to retain Diels’ εὐκυκλέος  as the 
lectio difficilior is certainly tenable, since Simplicius is recognized as our best authority 
on Parmenides192 and there is perhaps an equivalence between truth and reality found in 
the term ἀτρεμές. The connection between truth and persuasion is nevertheless a pervasive 
theme in the work that needs further exploration. 
 The way of truth possesses a persausive element not found in opinions of mortals. 
The nature of this element is not immediately clear: what is the connection between truth 
and persuasion and from where does Parmenides’ account derive these qualities? 
Mourelatos argues that truth “will exercise a compelling power over men, both each and 
all.”193 The compelling power of persuasion results in men’s trust and obedience; even 
men who adhere to false beliefs trust that their opinions are true (πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, 
B8.39). Parmenides’ account of Being, which corrects men’s false assumptions, attempts 
to overturn these false assumptions through its emphasis on truth and logical necessity; 
his conception of Being is marked by necessity (χρή, B6) and compulsion (ἀνάγκη, B8.16, 
30), and πίστις ἀληθής drives away (ἀπῶσε) the impossible notions of the generation and 
destruction of Being (B8.28). Parmenides’ truth is not, like Xenophanes’ τὸ σαφές, 
derived from autopsy; on the contrary, he remarks that sight and hearing are unreliable 
means of gauging the truth: 
οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα· 
    ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα  
    μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,  
   νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν 
   καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον  
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192 Taran 1965, 16-17. 
 
193 Mourelatos 1970, 160. 
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   ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. (B7) 
 
Parmenides describes the senses as ineffective (“unseeing sight,” ἄσκοπον ὄμμα) and 
imprecise (“ringing hearing,” ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν). The truth - that Being is one, eternal, and 
immutable – cannot be found through the senses and habitual experience (ἔθος πολύπειρον) 
because these lead men to believe that Being is generated, destroyed, and changeable 
(B8.38-41). This inability to distinguish Being and Not-Being is ironically linked with 
blindness and deafness (τυφλοί, κωφοί, B6.7).194 The senses are not useful as critical tools 
(ἄκριτα φῦλα, B6.7), and so the argument must be decided by reason (κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι, B7). 
The series of deductive arguments made in B8 and other fragments reveals that Being 
cannot be as mutable and varied as it appears to the senses; for example, he argues that if 
there can only be Being and Not-Being (B2, B8.15-18) and if Not-Being, because it is 
inconceivable, is impossible (B2, B6), then Being cannot be generated or change because 
Not-Being would be the only source for change and generation (B8.5-15, 26-28).195 
Parmenides argues that truth and persuasiveness are found only in reasoning and abstract 
argumentation, while the senses lead to false opinions that contradict the conclusions 
derived from these methods.  
 The second part of Parmenides’ poem is dedicated to descriptions of δόξαι, which 
include comments on the physical composition of the heavens and the universe. This 
portion of the poem has raised several significant critical questions, most notably how 
these descriptions of natural phenomena and their sources fit in with the first part of the 
                                                 
194 Taran (1965, 61-72) argues that this is a specific attack on Heraclitus and similar thinkers. Although this 
is possible, his argument that this cannot be referring to humans in general because Parmenides refers to 
two groups of mortals in B8.53-59 seems unconvincing.  
 
195 It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe in full the nature of Parmenides’ Being and the 
argumentation found in fragments B2-B8. For a more detailed discussion of these topics, see KRS 1995, 
249-254 and Mourelatos 1970, 94-135. 
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 poem, which denies the possibility of change, movement, distinction, generation, and 
destruction. If there can be only Being and Not-Being, why do the goddess and 
Parmenides bother describing δόξαι that are explicitly prefaced as being false (B1.28-30, 
8.51-52)? Before I address this question, I will focus my attention on the meaning of the 
term δόξα. In Xenophanes’ work, the word δόκος and related terms refer to suppositions 
and conjecture. Parmenides use of such words has two shades of meaning: the first, like 
Xenophanes’ usage, has a subjective force and refers to opinions and beliefs (βροτῶν 
δόξας, B1.30); the second has a more objective sense and describes how things seem or 
appear (τὰ δοκοῦντα, B1.31).196 Is the second part of Parmenides’ poem concerned with 
the world of opinions, the world of appearances, or both? Taran sees the two notions as 
compatible and translates τὰ δοκοῦντα as “the beliefs of men,” “what appears to men,” and 
“the appearances.”197 Mourelatos draws a stronger distinction between the two and 
argues that δόξα and related terms consistently bear the connotation of acceptance and 
belief rather than of appearance.198 There is, however, a connection in Parmenides’ 
argument between men’s beliefs and things as they appear. He notes that the senses are 
unreliable guides for mortals and that the truth can only be realized through 
argumentation (λόγος, B7). He does not seem to have attributed any reality to beliefs 
based on appearances and sense experience; the only real thing for Parmenides is Being 
itself (οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται / ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, B8.36-37); everything else exists 
in name only. Whereas Xenophanes’ conception of δόκος serves as a viable, albeit 
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between δόξα and δέχομαι; he does, however, concede that Parmenides also attacks men’s confidence in 
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 inferior, alternative when autopsy and personal experience are not available avenues for 
acquiring information, Parmenides’ δόξαι are fundamentally untrue because they violate 
the principles and tenets established by logical argumentation in B8. Xenophanes can say 
that his suppositions on the world of the divine resemble the truth (ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι, 
B35) since the primary distinction between δόκος and τὸ σαφές is that the latter has been 
verified by direct observation while the former has not and often cannot be. Parmenides 
does not and cannot assign any positive truth-value to δόξαι because he does not believe in 
degrees of truth; he poses a fundamental distinction between Being and Not-Being and 
excludes all other possibilities (B2, B8.15-16).  
 If these δόξαι are devoid of any positive truth-value, why does Parmenides bother  
 
reporting them at all? He makes two comments that perhaps explain why he appends the 
δόξαι to his account of Being. The first remark comes at the end of the proem, after the 
goddess says that he will learn both the truth and the opinions of mortals: 
  ἀλλ’ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα  
    χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα. (B1.31-32) 
The meaning of these lines is highly contested. Taran argues that the goddess is here is 
explaining how it was necessary (χρῆν ) for what appeared (τὰ δοκοῦντα) to exist 
acceptably (δοκίμως εἶναι) for mortals before the existence of the logical distinctions found 
in Parmenides’ poem.199 Recognizing word play between δοκοῦντα and δοκίμως, 
Mourelatos sees these lines a comment on how what is accepted (τὰ δοκοῦντα) would have 
to be (counterfactual χρῆν) to exist acceptably (δοκίμως εἶναι);200 in other words, 
Parmenides is reporting false δόξαι for the sake of argument in order show how these 
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 conjectures would have to exist in order for them to be considered genuine.201 There are 
many other critical interpretations,202 but Mourelatos’ reading seems to fit closely with 
Parmenides’ other explicit comment on the reasons for discussing the δόξαι: 
  τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω, 
    ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσηι. (B8.60-61) 
 
The goddess final preface before the account of mortal opinions concerns authority:  
Parmenides will learn the “deceptive order” (κόσμον ἀπατηλὸν, B8.52) of her account so  
that no other mortal theory (τις βροτῶν γνώμη) can outstrip him. By learning mortal 
opinions, he can present an account of the natural world that, though false, is appealing 
and more logically sound than the theories of other thinkers. His authority is thus 
predicated both on his ability to present the truth - that Being exists - and on the strength 
of his false, but well-reasoned, account of mortal δόξαι that excels all other accounts of 
the perceptible world.  
 Like Xenophanes, Parmenides uses traditional poetic language to express his 
innovative arguments. There is an abundance of words and phrases either drawn directly 
from Homer and Hesiod or modeled on expressions found in their poems.203 To what 
degree does his authority rely on traditional poetic values? I will argue that although 
Parmenides uses epic language, images, and motifs, his ideas on the nature of Being are 
more difficult to fit into the poetic tradition than the theology of Xenophanes. The vivid 
imagery and language in the proem and the reliance on divine revelation seem more 
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203 Mourelatos (1970, 4-11) notes that over 90% of Parmenides’ vocabulary is found in early epic and cites 
many further examples of exact or close verbal parallels between Parmenides’ poem and the works of 
Homer (including the Homeric Hymns). 
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 traditionally epic than anything found in Xenophanes’ hexameter; the arguments 
themselves, however, and the focus on λόγος as the criterion for judgment of truth are 
wholly non-traditional. The overall effect is perhaps, as Mourelatos says about 
Parmenides’ meter, “at once too modern and too archaic.”204
 The proem contains a vivid description of a metaphysical journey and divine 
revelation; the narrator is led by the Heliades past the gates of Night and Day to the 
goddess who explains to him both the true nature of Being and the false opinions of men. 
This revelatory event has, like Hesiod’s encounter with the Muses in Theogony 24-34, 
sparked much critical debate concerning its meaning and sincerity. Some have argued 
that the proem is presented as a genuine experience,205 while others have argued that the 
journey is purely allegorical206 or metaphorical.207 The presence of images and ideas that 
recur in the goddess’ speech - such as light and darkness (Ἡλιάδες, Νυκτός, φάος, Νυκτός 
τε καὶ Ἤματος, B1.9-11; πάντα φάος καὶ νὺξ ὀνόμασται, B9), circles (κύκλοις, B1.8; εὐκύκλου 
σφαίρης, B8.43), and persuasion (πεῖσαν, B1.16; Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος, B2) – perhaps 
suggests that this journey is an allegorical trip beyond the world of the senses and 
opinions (i.e. beyond the gates of night and day) and into the world of unified Being (i.e. 
into the world of the goddess).208 This does not prove that the experience is intended to 
be interpreted as entirely figurative; as West notes about Hesiod’s encounter, visions 
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 often naturally conform to one’s beliefs and expectations.209 Perhaps more telling is the 
ambiguity and vagueness found in the proem: why doesn’t Parmenides name the 
goddess? It is rare for the epic poets not to name the specific god or goddess in the 
narration; usually the singular form of θεός is employed by characters within the poem 
who are unaware of the specific source of divine presence or interference.210 It is highly 
unlikely, however, that ignorance is the cause for the knowledgeable (εἰδότα φῶτα, B1.3) 
narrator’s withholding of the name. Taran argues that the goddess’ anonymity “shows 
that she represents no religious figure at all and only stands as a literary device implying 
that the ‘revelation’ is the truth discovered by Parmenides himself.”211 This 
interpretation, however, seems both to overemphasize the individual agency of the 
narrator and to underestimate the significance of the divine source for most of the poem.  
 The journey of the narrator incorporates both active and passive elements. Unlike 
Hesiod, he is not approached by the goddess but instead travels to her abode; that the 
speaker ventures beyond the limits of the mortal world suggests that the quest for truth is 
an active and deliberate enterprise. The language of the proem, however, suggests a more 
passive role in this trip: that the speaker is being carried is repeated four times in the first 
four lines and in each case he is either the direct object (ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν; φέρει εἰδότα 
φῶτα; με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι) or the subject of a passive verb (τῆι φερόμην). It is the 
horses who put him on the journey (B1.2), it is the Heliades who persuade Dike to open 
the gates (B1.15), and it is the goddess who, without being asked, delivers the accounts of 
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 Being and opinion. Unlike Xenophanes, Parmenides does not provide significant 
biographical data for his narrator;212 the only information we can glean from the poem is 
that the speaker is a young man (κοῦρ’, B1.24) and that he is in some way knowledgeable 
(εἰδότα φῶτα, B1.3).213 The lack of personal information is in some ways similar to the 
anonymity of the bard found in the works Homer; although Parmenides uses the first 
person to describe the revelation, the journey and the lessons found at the end of it seem 
accessible not only to one individual but to the class of those “in the know” (εἰδότα φῶτα, 
B1.3). Although Taran argues that presence of the goddess is merely a literary device and 
that the truth of Parmenides’ account rests solely upon logical demonstration,214 there is 
not necessarily an exclusive division between the method with which one obtains 
knowledge and the divine source of knowledge. As we have seen in Homer, humans and 
gods share the same method of acquiring knowledge (i.e. sense perception), but the gods 
are still an important source of information because their faculties of perception far 
exceed those of humans. Parmenides offers a different method for investigating truth than 
that found in Homer and Xenophanes, but the presence of the goddess may serve a 
function very similar to the one performed by the gods in Homer: through powers 
available to men, she transmits to them knowledge previously unavailable to them 
because of human limitations. The goddess may be metaphorical, but nonetheless she 
bears a special significance in delivering the innovative understanding of truth. The 
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 divine origin of these accounts, therefore, plays an important role along with the logical 
argumentation in Parmenides’ poetic authority.  
 Reliance on a divine source is a traditional poetic element in Parmenides’ work, 
though the information communicated is quite radical. One last question I wish to 
examine is to what extent can Parmenides’ poem be read as part of the poetic tradition: 
how does his work fit with those of other poets?  Xenophanes rejected the immoral and 
anthropomorphic elements found in the epic presentation of the gods but retained other 
values, such as an ethical conception of the divine, the experiential basis for knowledge, 
and the use of a poetic persona. Parmenides does not mention other poets by name or in 
general, but the language and imagery found in his work has led scholars to draw 
comparisons with his epic predecessors and with contemporary poets. Some have 
compared the journey motif found in  Parmenides’ poem with the theme of homecoming 
found in the Odyssey.215 Others note the similarities between the beginning of the 
goddess’ speech (B1.24-32) and the Muses’ report to Hesiod in Theogony 26-28, as well 
as between Parmenides’ gates of Night and Day (B1.11-20) and Hesiod’s gates of 
Tartarus (Th. 736-757).216 Bowra notes that the image of the chariot is frequently found 
in other poems, notably in those of Pindar, as a metaphor for poetry.217  Parmenides’ 
incorporation of these images and motifs suggests that this poem is constructed as part of 
the same poetic tradition as that of Homer, Hesiod, and later authors such as Pindar. The 
content of the poem, however, is radically different: no previous poem champions the 
same logical criteria or purely abstract concept of reality. Why then does Parmenides fill 
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 his poem with traditional images and motifs that are bound to draw comparisons with his 
poetic predecessors? Is he, like Xenophanes, correcting these earlier models, albeit 
through more allusive and less explicit language? Jaeger argues that this is indeed the 
case: 
…how could the Greeks, with their fondness for any sort of contest, have 
helped seeing in Parmenides’ adoption of the verse-form of his venerable 
theological predecessor [Hesiod] an avowed intention to compete with 
him on his own territory, however sharply the rigorous conceptual 
deductions of the Eleatic must have contrasted with Hesiod’s fanciful 
mythopoeia?  
 
While these allusions to earlier poets could be polemical, it is also possible that 
Parmenides is using them for a less aggressive reason; Mourelatos suggests that although 
he had a different purpose than the epic poets, Parmenides used their language, images, 
motifs to “think new thoughts in and through them.”218 Just as one uses a known object 
as a metaphor for an unknown one in order explain a new concept, so Parmenides uses a 
familiar model to explain an unfamiliar one. The epic form would then be a clear and 
meaningful way of expressing thoughts that were wholly untraditional. Unfortunately, 
Parmenides does not make a clear programmatic statement concerning his choice to write 
in traditional epic hexameter.  
Perhaps the most explicit comment Parmenides makes about the poetic form of 
his work is the goddess’ remark before she begins her account of the δόξαι:  
    δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας  
    μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. (B8.51-52)  
 
What exactly does he mean by “the deceptive order of my words” (κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων 
ἀπατηλὸν)? The most immediate interpretation in this context is that he is labeling the 
“conceptual scheme” (κόσμον) of the world of appearances found within the goddess’ 
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 speech as false.219 But could there also be an allusion to a formal aspect of the poem 
itself? The terms κόσμος and the plural ἔπη are frequently used to describe the 
arrangement of poetry and poetry itself (particularly the epic genre). The phrase κόσμος 
ἐπέων is found in Solon, where he contrasts the poetic form of his offering with that of a 
speech (κόσμον ἐπέων †ὠιδὴν ἀντ’ ἀγορῆς θέμενος, 1.2, West).220 Furthermore, as I 
discussed in my second chapter, κόσμος is in epic often associated with truth: to speak 
κατὰ κόσμον is, among other things, to give an accurate account (Od. 8.489), and the 
veracity of a speech is frequently judged by its formal qualities (μορφὴ ἐπέων, Od. 
11.367). The phrase κόσμον ἀπατηλόν can thus have more than one meaning in reference 
to his poetic form: Parmenides could be suggesting that the verbal arrangement of false 
δόξαι is deliberately ambiguous or contradictory,221 or he could be implying that this 
account has an attractive and plausible form despite its falsity;222 these interpretations, 
however, need not be exclusive. In either case Parmenides’ acknowledgement of the 
deceptive form of his second account serves as a warning to his audience: one must judge 
an argument by reason (κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι, B7) and not be deceived by false accounts, 
however attractive and plausible they may seem. Although poetry is a useful vehicle for 
his ideas, he concedes that it has the capacity for deception.  
 Like Parmenides, Xenophanes uses traditional poetic elements to bolster his 
innovative ideas. Xenophanes, however, seems more conscious of his place within the 
poetic tradition: he develops ideas found within the epic poems while at the same time 
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 criticizing the epic poets for their tendency to misrepresent the gods. While Parmenides 
uses language and images found in epic poetry, his abstract concept of Being seems far 
removed from the ideas found in the genre. His criterion for truth is logical necessity, 
which is free both from the concerns for propriety found in Homer and the emphasis on 
seemliness found in Xenophanes (B1, B26)223 and from the experiential basis for 
knowledge found in both authors. Nonetheless, Parmenides’ claim to divine authority is 
one remarkably traditional element not found in the work of Xenophanes. The 
prominence of a goddess in the poem, as in the works of Homer and Hesiod, adds 
credibility and significance to information far removed from human experience. The 
remoteness of this knowledge is not, however, due to a spatial or temporal separation, as 
it is in epic poetry, but rather to the discovery of a logical abstraction fundamentally in 
conflict with human experience: the world is not as it appears.  
Pindar   
 Pindar, like Parmenides, also composes poetry about matters beyond the normal 
limits of the human world. The content of Pindar’s poetry, however, focuses on 
traditional myths rather than on abstract logical distinctions. Unlike Xenophanes and 
Parmenides, he does not explicitly attempt to shift the way in which his listeners view the 
world; rather, his epinician odes draw material from the world of gods and the 
mythological past in order to praise athletic victors. Although this generic distinction is 
important, the manner in which Pindar treats both this mythological material and his 
poetic predecessors reveals that his own attitude towards truth and authority are in some 
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 ways similar to that of Xenophanes. Like Xenophanes, Pindar occasionally corrects 
mythological accounts found in earlier poems. I will discuss two examples of such 
correction: the story of Pelops in Olympian 1.25-94 and the defense of Ajax in Nemean 
7.20-27. I will argue that in these passages as well as others one can find a conception of 
truth that incorporates personal experience, but ultimately privileges concerns for 
propriety. Pindar adopts several epic values in a manner similar to that of Xenophanes, 
but he relies more on the traditional forms of authority, especially on a connection with 
the world of the divine, than Xenophanes does.  
 The first Olympian ode, written in praise of Hieron, contains the story of Pelops 
as its centerpiece. Pindar does not merely tell his version of the tale, he also corrects the 
accounts of his predecessors: according to him, Pelops was not cooked and partly eaten, 
as others say, but rather abducted by Poseidon. After indicating that Pelop’s shoulder was 
ivory from birth, Pindar remarks about the deceptive nature of poetic accounts: 
   
ἦ θαύματα πολλά, καί πού τι καὶ βροτῶν 
φάτις ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀλαθῆ λόγον   
δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.  
Χάρις δ’, ἅπερ ἅπαντα τεύχει τὰ μείλιχα θνατοῖς, 
ἐπιφέροισα τιμὰν καὶ ἄπιστον ἐμήσατο πιστόν 
ἔμμεναι τὸ πολλάκις· 
ἁμέραι δ’ ἐπίλοιποι  
μάρτυρες σοφώτατοι.  
ἔστι δ’ ἀνδρὶ φάμεν ἐοικὸς ἀμφὶ δαιμόνων καλά· μείων γὰρ αἰτία. (Ol. 1.28-35) 
 
The contrast between the true account (τὸν ἀλαθῆ λόγον) and stories embellished with 
various lies (δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις μῦθοι) highlights the tendency for poets to 
exaggerate their claims. The term for true, ἀλαθῆ, refers to what actually happened (i.e. 
historical accuracy), whereas the lies (ψεύδεσι) are exaggerations or complete falsehoods  
(i.e. literary fabrications). The grace of poetry (Χάρις) leads men to believe in what would 
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 otherwise be implausible (ἄπιστον ἐμήσατο πιστόν), an idea reminiscent of Hesiod’s ψεύδεα 
ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα (Th. 27) and Parmenides’ κόσμος ἀπατηλός (B8.52). These two authors cite 
divine revelations as tokens for the validity of their accounts; what does Pindar offer to 
his audience to vouch for his version of this story? There are two significant elements 
behind his claim: the presence (or lack) of eyewitnesses and the standard of seemliness.  
 Visual observation is championed in the works of Homer and Xenophanes as a 
sure criterion for knowledge, whereas in Parmenides the senses are untrustworthy gauges 
of truth. Pindar occasionally refers to his own eyewitness testimony when referring to a 
victor’s accomplishment; for example, he claims that he will bear witness (μαρτυρήσω) for 
the good character of Hagesias of Syracuse (Ol. 6.21). The implication of μάρτυς and 
related words is not only a legal connotation, but also claim to first hand experience; as 
Most has noted, these terms are “limited in meaning to those whose knowledge of an 
event is dependent upon their having been present for it.”224 Pindar seems more reluctant 
to claim experiential knowledge for events in the mythical past,225 although he will cite 
relevant witnesses if they exist.226 In the case of Pelops, and more generally the tendency 
of poetry to embellish, Pindar claims that the remaining days (ἁμέραι ἐπίλοιποι) prove to 
be the wisest witnesses. What precisely does this statement mean? In other poems Pindar 
refers to the importance of time for understanding truth; for example, Χρόνος is called the 
“only tester of  genuine truth” (ἐξελέγχων μόνος ἀλάθειαν ἐτήτυμον, Ol. 10.53-55). While 
the sentiment in that passage – that the truth becomes evident only after time has elapsed 
                                                 
224 Most 1985, 177. 
 
225 Most 1985, 176-177; Pratt 1993, 123-124. 
 
226 E.g. Apollo is no false witness (οὐ ψεῦδις ὁ μάρτυς) for the deeds of Neoptolemus, since his glory at 
Delphi remains steadfast (Nem. 7.49). 
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 –  seems clear enough, it is unclear how knowledge of the true story of Pelops will 
emerge by virtue of time: wouldn’t the passing of time only  further confuse the nature of 
an event in the mythological past rather than clarify it?227 The future days will not, in 
fact, be witnesses for the exact account of what happened, which Xenophanes calls τὸ 
σαφές; on the contrary, the future time apparently will prove what men accept to be true 
and believable. Just as Apollo and Delphi serve as witnesses for the glory of 
Neoptolemus (Nem. 7.43-49), so Pindar has confidence that the reputation of Pelops, 
presumably the noble version supported by himself, will remain intact in the future and 
its proliferation will vouch for its authenticity. Despite the presence of slanderous rumors, 
he seems to have faith that the truth will ultimately prevail among humans.228 He here 
uses the language of witness (μάρτυρες) as an indicator of truth, but this type of 
observation is much different from the empirical standards of Xenophanes, for whom the 
truth (τὸ σαφές) is something seen first hand and not verified by common reception. 
 The more emphatic claim behind Pindar’s version of the Pelops myth is that he is 
presenting a more appropriate and seemly account than the cannibalistic one delivered by 
others. After his comment on the testimony of future days, he remarks that it is 
appropriate (ἐοικός) for men to speak fine things (καλά) about the gods. The opposition 
between true and false accounts is ultimately resolved by a consideration of what is 
seemly. After he summarizes the slanderous account devised by envious neighbors, 
Pindar does not immediately label this version as false; instead he notes his inability 
                                                 
227 Pratt 1993, 124-125. 
 
228 Pratt 1993, 116-117. Cf. Bacchylides Ep. 13.167-170:  
ἁ δ’ ἀλαθεία φιλεῖ νι- 
  κᾶν, ὅ τε πανδ[α]μάτω[ρ] χρό- 
  νος τὸ καλῶς 
[ἐ]ργμένον αἰὲν ἀ[έξε...
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 (ἄπορα) to call any of the gods gluttonous and demonstrates his repulsion with the abrupt 
ἀφίσταμαι (Ol. 1.52).229 In his remarks about propriety, he seems especially interested in 
the repercussions of slanderous or blasphemous speech. After his comment about seemly 
(ἐοικός) and fine (καλά) speech, he notes that this typically incurs less blame (αἰτία). 
Similarly, after his vow to stand apart, he claims that slanderers receive poverty as 
punishment. While he is likely posing his version of this myth as the true account, his 
focus on piety and appropriate speech is given precedence in his explanation for rejecting 
the traditional story.  
 One can see his concern for propriety in other passages as well. When he 
mentions Heracles’ struggles with the other immortals, Pindar commands his mouth to 
cease hateful and inappropriate (παρὰ καιρόν) abuse (Ol. 9.35-39); he does not correct the 
story, nor does he give any indication that it is in fact false, but quickly changes topic 
because, like Xenophanes (B1.21-23), he feels conflict among the immortals is unseemly. 
The exact truth is not always a priority for Pindar, especially when it conflicts with the 
standards of propriety. He notes in Nemean 5 that it is not always profitable for the whole 
truth (ἅπασα ἀλάθει’) to reveal itself exactly (ἀτρεκές,16-18). But the concepts of truth and 
seemliness are not always in conflict. Pindar seems to associate truth, at least concerning 
the gods, with piety. In Pythian 3 he notes:  
   εἰ δὲ νόῳ τις ἔχει θνατῶν ἀλαθείας ὁδόν, χρὴ πρὸς μακάρων  
τυγχάνοντ’ εὖ πασχέμεν. (Pyth. 3.103-104) 
 
The implication of this passage is that keeping to the way of truth (ἀλαθείας ὁδόν) entails 
modestly accepting what the gods have given rather than impiously attempting to subvert 
the will of the gods, as Asclepius does earlier in the poem by reviving the dead and 
                                                 
229 Gildersleeve (1885 ad loc.) notes that asyndeton is often used to express repugnance. 
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 violating τὰ ἐοικότα (55-60). Pindar’s conception of propriety is then much like Homer’s 
formulation of κόσμος: though occasionally accuracy and seemliness conflict, normally 
the two overlap and the appropriate often dictates what can be considered true about the 
gods.  
 One major point of contention between Pindar and Homer is the treatment of the 
epic heroes Ajax and Odysseus. Pindar is highly critical of Odysseus’ slander and 
treachery (Nem. 8.20-34) and claims that Ajax has been treated unfairly in the works of 
Homer:  
   ἐγὼ δὲ πλέον’ ἔλπομαι  
λόγον Ὀδυσσέος ἢ πάθαν διὰ τὸν ἁδυεπῆ γενέσθ’ Ὅμηρον·   
ἐπεὶ ψεύδεσί οἱ ποτανᾷ <τε> μαχανᾷ  
σεμνὸν ἔπεστί τι· σοφία δὲ κλέπτει παράγοισα μύθοις. τυφλὸν δ’ ἔχει  
ἦτορ ὅμιλος ἀνδρῶν ὁ πλεῖστος. εἰ γὰρ ἦν 
ἓ τὰν ἀλάθειαν ἰδέμεν, οὔ κεν ὅπλων χολωθείς 
ὁ καρτερὸς Αἴας ἔπαξε διὰ φρενῶν  
λευρὸν ξίφος· (Nem. 7.20-27)   
This critique, like the one in Olympian 1, highlights the tendency for poetic exaggeration. 
Pindar claims the sweet sound (ἁδυεπῆ), skill (σοφία), and majesty (σεμνόν) of Homer have 
conferred upon Odysseus a greater account than he deserves. This criticism, like the 
previous one, includes both a visual aspect and a proprietary element to truth. Pindar uses 
the motifs of sight and blindness to express the unjust treatment of Ajax in the works of 
Homer; he claims that most men have blind hearts (τυφλὸν ἦτορ), for if they could see the 
truth (τὰν ἀλάθειαν ἰδέμεν) the fate of Ajax would have played out differently. The 
superiority of Ajax is here depicted as a visually evident fact that men failed to notice 
because of their own blindness. There is an interesting juxtaposition between those within 
the story who should have seen the glory of Ajax and those outside the tale who are 
deceived by Homer’s sweet words. The effect is that Pindar’s version is aligned with 
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 autopsy whereas Homer’s account is reduced to deceptive words (ψεύδεσι). Both versions, 
however, are outside the realm of the author’s experience; although Pindar references 
“seeing the truth,” his account has no more empiric weight than that of Homer. The 
language of autopsy is primarily figurative (as the phrase “blind heart” might suggest) but 
it emphasizes the strength of the poet’s conviction that the hero is not receiving his due. 
The proprietary concerns in this passage are not about pious or ethical behavior, but 
rather about the proper allocation of praise and blame. In other passages Pindar uses the 
term καιρός to refer to restrained and reverent commentary about the gods (Ol. 9.38) as 
well as to proper acknowledgement of men’s achievements: he notes in Pythian 9 the 
importance of καιρός in reporting μεγάλαι ἀρεταί (76-79). Here the ἀρεταί of Ajax are his 
feats in battle, in which no other hero save Achilles can compare – a point that Homer 
himself frequently makes.230  
 One last feature I would like to discuss is the relationship of Pindar’s poetry to the 
world of the divine: does Pindar, like his epic predecessors as well as Parmenides, make a 
claim to personal communication with the gods? Although he does not present any 
incidents as vivid as Hesiod’s encounter with the Muses or Parmenides’ supernatural 
journey, Pindar frequently refers to the Muses as sources and allies in the poetic process. 
For example, in Olympian 3 he remarks tentatively (ποι) that a Muse stood beside him as 
he formed his poem in Doric meter (4-9). That the Muses provide him with information 
otherwise unattainable to mortal men seems evident in Paean 6:  
 ταῦτα θεοῖσι [μ]έν  
πιθεῖν σοφοὺ̣[ς] δυνατόν, 
βροτοῖσιν δ’ ἀμάχανο[ν εὑ]ρέμεν·  
     ἀλλὰ παρθένοι γάρ, ἴσθ’ ὅτ[ι], Μο[ῖ]σαι,  
πάντα, κε[λαι]νεφεῖ σὺν  
                                                 
230 E.g. Il. 2.768-769, 17.279-280.
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       πατρὶ Μναμοσ[ύν]ᾳ τε 
      τοῦτον ἔσχετ[ε τεθ]μόν,  
κλῦτε νῦν· (51-8). 
 
The passage is reminiscent of the invocation at Iliad 2.484-494: the Muses, the  
daughters of Zeus who know all (ἴσθ’ ὅτ[ι], Μο[ῖ]σαι, / πάντα), deliver select portions of 
their knowledge to humans who could not achieve them on their own. Furthermore, The 
Muses are frequently connected with the notion of truth in Pindar’s poetry; in Olympian 
10, the Muse and ᾿Αλάθεια, another daughter of Zeus, are responsible for ensuring the 
poem owed to Hagesidamos is completed. He also notes that the Muse becomes more 
eminent through correct reports (ἀγγελίας ὀρθᾶς, Pyth. 4.279). Inspiration from the Muses 
is thus an important part of Pindar’s claim to poetic authority on matters beyond human 
experience.  
 The Muses are not always, however, dispensers of information, as they often are 
in the works of Homer.231 In Olympian 6, Pindar remarks that he can personally attest to 
good character of Hagesias, and that the Muses will aid him (17-21);  the Muses here are 
assistants in the shaping of material familiar to the poet, rather than teachers or sources of 
information. In Pythian 10, the poet guides the chariot of the Muses which has been 
provided his patron (64-66).232 Unlike the young man in Parmenides’ first fragment, the 
poet (and his patron) is portayed actively (ἄγων ἄγοντα). The inspiration from the Muses 
provides the power (horses), but the chariot is ultimately guided by the poet.233 The 
inclusion of personal testimony (Ol. 6.17-21) and descriptions of the poet’s guiding role 
                                                 
231 Though, as Murray (1981, 95) notes, the Muses also play an important role for the performance of the 
poem in Homer and the epic tradition. 
 
232 Cf. Simpson 1969 for more examples of the chariot metaphor in the poems of Pindar. 
 
233 Simpson 1969, 439-440. 
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 in the poetic process demonstrate that Pindar, like Hesiod in Works and Days, can draw 
on personal experience as well as divine inspiration received from the Muses.  
Pindar’s incorporation of seemliness and autopsy found in his rejection of 
mythological accounts is similar to Xenophanes’ approach. Unlike Xenophanes, 
however, Pindar does not completely reject the tradition of poetic inspiration; like 
Hesiod, he incorporates a personal element as an important component of his authority 
along with divine inspiration. His conception of truth includes historical accuracy, but the 
concept of seemliness often dictates whether this truth ought to be said; as he notes in 
Nemean 5.16-18, the truth should not always be reported. Whereas Xenophanes seems 
frustrated at the lack of clear and certain truth (τὸ σαφές), he does not resort to claims of 
poetic inspiration, nor does he ever explicitly subordinate the factual truth to what is 
seemly. Though seemliness is, of course, an important part of Xenophanes’ theological 
pronouncements, he does not appear to see any conflict between propriety and truth.  
Although both authors demonstrate a keen interest in the gods and the definitions 
of piety, Pindar’s approach is much more traditional. His view of human success 
ultimately depends on the goodwill of the gods, who fulfill men’s prayers in return for 
piety (Ol. 8.8-14) and punish men for their impiety (Ol.1.35, 53). Xenophanes sees a 
sharp divide between divine communication and human investigative enterprise, and 
champions the latter as the better mode for understanding the world, inasmuch as he 
believes that the gods have never communicated with mortals (B18). Even in his most 
traditional poems, he does not pray for tangible benefits, such as athletic victories, from 
the gods but instead asks for the ability to act justly (B1.15-16). Unlike Pindar and 
Hesiod, Xenophanes does not see pious and virtuous behavior as a means for obtaining 
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 divine favor, but rather as an end of itself for which men should pray. His conception of 
the divine, though influenced by the ethical considerations of Hesiod, is removed from 
human experience, since his god neither communicates directly with mortals nor 
(apparently) offers immediate tangible rewards for human piety. Nevertheless, he sees his 
god as compatible with the poetic and religious traditions, as well as with the intellectual 
emphasis of contemporary thinkers. While Parmenides’ abstract and logical account of 
existence seems quite incompatible with previous modes of Greek thought, Xenophanes 
manages to present an account of the divine that is less radical and abstract than that of 
Parmenides, as well as more innovative and provocative than Pindar’s largely traditional 
theology. He accomplishes this feat by incorporating into his writing both traditional 
elements that would be familiar to his audience and more radical comments supported by 
empirical observations and inferences drawn from them. Through this balance he 
maintains poetic authority even though he – unlike Homer, Hesiod, Parmenides, and 
Pindar – does not claim any immediate access to the gods or the Muses.  
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